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International Extradition and the Medellin
Cocaine Cartel: Surgical Removal of
Colombian Cocaine Traffickers for
Trial in the United States
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States enters the 1990s, illicit drugs, particularly
cocaine, have stampeded their way to the forefront of the problems
confronting this country. President Bush recently declared cocaine,
once proclaimed as an aphrodisiac, a solution to morphine addiction,
and a glamorous means of escape "like flying to Paris for breakfast," 1
to be "the quicksand of our entire society,"12 and "the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today."' 3 The President further declared
that "[o]ur most serious problem today is cocaine and, in particular,
crack."' 4 Though some may characterize these statements as political
rhetoric, they highlight the war-like character of the United States'
campaign against drug trafficking.
During the 1980s, eighty percent of the refined cocaine 5 and between fifty and sixty percent of the marijuana available on the United
States market came from Colombia. 6 In the minds of many Americans, Colombia has become synonymous with drug trafficking. 7 The
source of most of the cocaine reaching the United States is the Colombian city of Medellin. From this hub, the Medellin drug trafficking
cartel controls the processing and distribution of cocaine from a virtually "untouchable" position. Relying on violence, intimidation, and
1.

G. GUGLIorrA & J. LEEN, KINGS OF COCAINE 17 (1989).

2. Remarks on the Upcoming National Drug Control Strategy Address, 25 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1303 (Sept. 5, 1989).
3. Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1304 (Sept. 5, 1989); see Morgenthau, Miller & Contreras, Now It's Bush's War:
The President Offers His Strategy Against Drugs-But He Needs Help from the States and
Colombia, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 1989, at 22.
4. Address to the Nation on the National Drug Control Strategy, 25 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1304 (Sept. 5, 1989).
5. Kohn, Company Town, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 6, 1989, at 68; see L.A. Times, Oct.
15, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
6. Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 70 (Fall 1988).
7. Rosenberg, The Kingdom of Cocaine, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 27, 1989, at 27.
Although Colombia grows only about 15% of the total coca crop used in the business, Colombia dominates cocaine's processing and export. Id.
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threats, the Medellin cartel has incapacitated many fundamental Colombian institutions, including the judiciary.8 Additionally, the cartel's entrenched position in Colombian society has affected the desire
of the Colombian citizenry to pursue and prosecute the traffickers. 9
In short, putting one trafficker in jail is not worth the bombings,
murders, and threats that the cartel will inflict on the Colombian people while the law enforcement process takes place.
International extradition promises to be one of the most powerful
weapons the United States and Colombia have at their disposal to
battle the Medellin cartel and cocaine trafficking. Extradition in effect will surgically remove the drug traffickers from their "untouchable" niche in Colombian society and place them in the United States,
where they cannot manipulate the criminal justice system. Additionally, extradition to the United States will transport the cocaine traffickers into an unintimidated society vehemently opposed to cocaine
and drug trafficking.
Though extradition plays a vital role in the battle against the
drug traffickers, actual extradition to the United States is only one
step in the lengthy legal process required to incarcerate these
criminals. First, Colombian law enforcement officials must identify
and capture the narcotraficantes.10 This is not an easy task. Second,
United States prosecutors must successfully develop cases against the
traffickers to support their extradition to the United States for trial.
During this process, Colombia must hold the traffickers while they
await extradition. Only after these steps have taken place can extradition serve its purpose.
This Comment will first show why extradition to the United
States occupies such an important position in the prosecution of the
Medellin cartel members and explain the general procedures and doctrines behind the international extradition process. Next, this Comment will analyze the United States-Colombia extradition treaty in
light of these doctrines and procedures and suggest methods to circumvent doctrinal obstacles that may hinder extradition of cartel
members. Furthermore, it will discuss relevant case law concerning
the extradition treaty to illustrate the trends that United States courts
are following in extradition proceedings involving Colombian drug
traffickers. Finally, this Comment will propose improvements and
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Bagley, supra note 6, at 70.
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modifications to the treaty that could facilitate extradition.II
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION IN CONTEXT

In order to fully understand the role that international extradition can play in prosecuting the Medellin cartel members, one must
examine three factors in Colombia's history. First, analysis must focus on the scope of the drug problem in Colombia. While it may not
surprise some people that cartel members occupy positions of immense power in Colombia, it may shock others to discover that the
traffickers enjoy positions of prestige. An understanding of the nature
and source of the traffickers' power in Colombia is fundamental to
appreciating the significance of extradition to the United States. Second, attention must focus on the inability of existing Colombian governmental institutions to battle the drug trafficking problem.
Extradition of cartel members to the United States assumes tremendous importance when Colombia's executive and judiciary cannot effectively prosecute and incarcerate its own offenders. Third, one must
examine the history of the United States-Colombia extradition treaty
to understand both the fear that cartel members have regarding extradition and the treaty's importance in the extradition process.
A.

The Medellih Cartel12

Colombia exports nearly all of the cocaine that reaches the
United States. The Colombian cocaine industry is considered to be
the most profitable business in the world.' 3 Although Colombia
grows relatively little coca, the plant from which cocaine is refined, it
dominates cocaine processing and distribution.14 In Colombia, ten or
twelve highly organized cartels control cocaine trafficking from the
initial purchase of coca leaves from Peruvian and Bolivian peasants to
the retail distribution of the processed drug in the United States.' 5
11. This Comment will not address other strategies designed to curb drug trafficking including direct military interdiction, domestic drug education designed to eradicate the demand
for cocaine, and monetary aid to Colombia.
12. In Colombia, the cartels are referred to as "mafia." In reality, these organizations are
not truly cartels, because they cannot control their product's price. Rosenberg, supra note 7,
at 27.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Welch, The ExtraterritorialWar on Cocaine:Perspectivesfrom Bolivia and Colombia,
12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 39, 60 (1988).
15. Id. Although there exist several Medellin cartels, these organizations will be referred
to collectively for convenience.
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Medellin, a city of two million people located in northwest Colombia, 16 serves as the center of the international cocaine industry. 17 The
Medellin cartel continues to amass immense fortunes by processing
and selling cocaine as a mass-market drug.' 8 In fact, Forbes magazine
recently ranked several of the billionaire members of the Medellin
cartel among the richest people in the world. 19
1. The Medellin Cartel's Impact in Colombia
A large part of the traffickers' power and influence in Colombia
stems from the cartel's ability to threaten and intimidate Colombian
law enforcement authorities and citizens with violence. 20 Since 1980,
drug assassins have gunned down 178 judges, including eleven of the
twenty-four members of the Colombian Supreme Court in 1986.21
The narcotraficantes have also assassinated two Colombian Justice
Ministers and a Colombian Attorney General. 22 In the first six
months of 1989, the city of Medellin recorded 2,338 murders, reflecting the pervasive violence confronting Colombia. 23 Seventy percent of
24
the murder victims were between fourteen and nineteen years of age.
In comparison, Washington, D.C. recorded a relatively paltry 303
25
murders in the same six-month span.
Apart from the cartel's violence and intimidation, another pri16.

Kohn, supra note 5, at 68.

17.
18.
19.

Welch, supra note 14, at 60.
Id. at 61.
Recent Developments in Colombia: Hearing before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing: Recent Developments] (statement of Benjamin A. Gilman, Co-Chairman, House Task Force on International
Narcotics Control).
20.

See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 30. Commenting on the violence created by the drug

trafficking industry, Rosenberg writes:
If one overwhelming problem stands out among Colombia's sea of troubles, it is murder. Colombia has long been a lawless place, a violent society where state institutions, particularly the justice system, are generally ignored. It never took much in
the past to spark violence; in 1948 the assassination of a populist political leader set

off a dispute among the two major political parties that killed 200,000 to 300,000
people over the next five years. In addition to corruption and drug addiction, cocaine
has brought back Colombia's violence, producing an almost complete collapse in the
rule of law.

Id.
21. Church, Going Too Far: The Drug Thugs Trigger a Backlash in Colombia and Kennebunkport, TIME, Sept. 4, 1989, at 12.
22. Id.

23. Contreras, Anarchy in Colombia, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 31.
24. Id. Reportedly, assassins may be hired for as little as ten dollars in Colombia. Id.
25.

Id.
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mary source of the narcotraficantes'power in Colombia remains the
apathy of the Colombian citizenry toward the drug traffickers. While
the Colombian government may have committed itself to extraditing
these criminals, the people of Colombia do not possess this same zeal.
The pursuit, capture, and extradition of the cartel members is too
costly for the Colombian populace. Colombian citizens blame the
on
wave of bombings, murders, and violence overtaking the country
26
stiff law enforcement and the prosecution of the traffickers. Polls
consistently show that most Colombians oppose the extradition of
drug traffickers. 2" The assassination of Luis Carlos Galan, a Colombian presidential candidate, 2 and the subsequent crackdown on the
narcotraficantes initially engendered some support for extradition.
However, this enthusiasm is now waning, as Colombians tire of the
traffickers' violent response to the crackdown. 29 Even a Galan aide
recently commented, "The price is becoming too high[;] [i]f the stability of the country requires dialogue with the narcotics traffickers, we
''
should do it. 3o
One explanation for this mind-set is that a prosperous cocaine
industry is in the Colombians' interest. The drug trafficking industry
employs many Colombian people and generates enormous revenue for
the country's treasury.31 Ironically, while serving this fiscally-based
26. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 31.
27. Id. The traffickers are using the wave of violence to promote one of their old
themes-that it is not drug trafficking that causes violence, but the repression of drug trafficking that engenders the violence. Id.
28. One observer described Galan to be "as beloved a symbol of hope in Colombia as
Robert Kennedy was in the United States." Id. at 30.

29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. Authorities have noted that this sentiment mirrors the attitude of most Colombians. Rosenberg writes:
The amazing thing about fighting cocaine in Colombia is not that it hasn't worked,
but that it takes place at all. Colombians fight cocaine partly because openly defying
the United States would carry high political costs, and partly because many people
still consider the traffickers to be bad people and are ashamed that their country is
identified with drugs. In short, because they still have values. But as the traffickers
raise the costs of such a battle, which they can do indefinitely, fewer and fewer
Colombians will be willing to become martyrs for a cause they see as not their own.
...There are many, many people in Colombia who are not ready, for reasons of
nationalism, economic self-interest, or physical self-preservation, to fight cocaine.
The more the United States tries to force Colombia to fight, the stronger resistance
will become. And the more the United States tries to force Colombia to turn its
already crippled political institutions against an organization that is stronger than the
government, the weaker these institutions will become.
Id at 32.
3 . Id. at 26. Colombia's per capita external debt is one of the lowest in Latin America,
partly due to the drug trafficking industry. Id. at 28.

Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J

960

[Vol. 13:955

interest in drug trafficking, cocaine has destroyed, via corruption or
violence, the Colombian institutions capable of fighting it. Now,
many Colombians accept drug trafficking, while some even admire
it.32 Every segment of Colombian society, including the military, the
Colombian guerrillas, the banks, the Catholic Church, industry, the
courts, and the police have some sort of relationship with the
traffickers.

33

Medellin cartel members have risen to "untouchable" positions
with respect to accountability to the laws in Colombia.34 This elevation is due to the lack of general support for their prosecution, their
wealth,3 5 and the concomitant power 36 that this wealth bestows. Cartel members respond to unfavorable newspaper editorials by assassinating the author. A similar fate awaits the judge who renders an
adverse court judgment.3 7 The cartels recently declared "total and
absolute war on the [Colombian] government, on the industrial and
political oligarchy, the journalists who have.., insulted us... and
everyone else that has persecuted us."38 As this threat suggests, Co32. Id. at 26-27. The drug trafficking industry especially appeals to the poor. Id. at 29.
A job in the cocaine industry pays many times the wages of a similar job in the legitimate job
market. Further, the cocaine industry offers a smart slum-dwelling youth the chance for advancement. A successful "mule," or drug runner, can hire a mule of his own and soon become
an independent trafficker. In this way, many Colombian youths have risen to positions of
power. Id.
33. Id. at 27.
34. In the early days of the trafficking, it cost the traffickers the peso equivalent of
$30,000 for a criminal charge to be dismissed in Colombia. Recently, the cost has risen to
$50,000. G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 243.

35. In commenting on the traffickers' wealth, Rosenberg writes:
The traffickers do not own everything in Colombia, but they own everything they
want to own. Colombia's factories do not attract them; factories are long-term investments and a poor way to launder dollars. The money has gone into farms, luxury
goods, and glamour businesses that are largely outside government regulation, such
as soccer teams, hotels, discos, contraband cigarettes and fighting bulls. The shopping centers of Medellin and Cali are filled with leather goods or dress boutiques run
by traffickers' wives or girlfriends. A boutique is a traditional birthday gift.
Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 29.
36. Colombian cocaine traffickers have their own air fleet, marina, and security force, as
well as maintenance crews, drivers, mechanics, lawyers (including four former justices of the
Colombian Supreme Court), accountants, financiers, and insurance writers. Further, the traffickers have their own private armies of assassins, known as sicarios. Typically, the sicarios are
comprised of two 16-year-olds riding a motorcycle and wielding machine pistols. See id. at 28.
37.

G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 243. If the judge refuses to take a bribe,

the traffickers might attempt to make threats or to pay a clerk to steal the briefs. Sometimes
the judge is beaten. If none of these strategies work, the traffickers may kill the judge. Id.
38. Morgenthau, Miller, Sandza, Contreras, Land & DeFrank, Hitting the Drug Lords.With Colombia Fighting for its Life, Bush Escalates the US Effort to Break the Cocaine Cartels, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1989, at 18.
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lombia faces an "extraordinary challenge to the survival of its longstanding democratic system."' 39 As efforts to retaliate against the
Medellin cartel mount, the drug traffickers consciously "do whatever
is necessary to save their lives and their lifestyles even if the result is
the destruction of the judicial foundation of that [democratic]
system."4o
In an ominous announcement, the United States Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI") and Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") stated in 1989 that the Colombian cartels are no longer content to simply sell cocaine to middlemen in the United States who
then distribute the drug on the streets. 41 Instead, the cartel now directly distributes cocaine in the United States. 42 Federal law enforcement officials maintain that cartel kingpins have established
smuggling, marketing, and money-laundering operations that extend
throughout the United States. 4 3 The financial returns from these undertakings are astronomical. A 1988 report estimated that the United
States public's expenditures on cocaine ranged from $100 to $150 billion per year.4 The cartel's combined gross wholesale revenues may
be as high as $5 billion per year.45 By comparison, coffee, Colombia's
46
largest legal retail export, brought in only $1.7 billion in 1988.
2.

The Medellin Cartel's Impact in the United States

Between 1980 and 1988, the United States spent over $10 billion
to fight cocaine trafficking. 47 These funds primarily went to Colombia
to limit its drug trafficking. The money was used to destroy the coca
crop, increase police and military efforts, arrest cartel members, dis39. Hearing:Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 24 (statement of Richard S. Gelbard,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State). In attempting to exploit and weaken democracies through perverted interpretations of the law, drug
traffickers try to find Colombian judges willing to interpret the law to their advantage. Id. at
34.

40. Id.
41.

Morgenthau, Sandza & Miller, Cocaine's 'Dirty300" NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1989, at

36.
42. Id. The character of the drug trafficking has transformed. Previously, hundreds of
traffickers would independently transport small loads of cocaine into the United States. Now,
the cartel exports multi-ton shipments into the United States. Id.
43. Id.
44. Hearing: Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 8 (statement of Representative
Charles B. Rangel, Chairman, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control).
45. Morgenthau, Sandza & Miller, supra note 41, at 37.
46. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 28.
47. Id. at 26.
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mantle cocaine labs, gather cocaine and its ingredients in Colombia,
keep the drug from crossing borders, and arrest drug traffickers and
users in the United States. 4 8 The goal of these measures was to make
cocaine either prohibitively expensive or unavailable to users in the
United States. 49 However, in the same eight-year span, the number of
coca fields in the Andes mountains increased by 250%,50 and the supply of cocaine in the United States increased tenfold. 51 Because of the
large supply of cocaine in the United States, the drug's black market
price dropped to twenty percent of its 1980 level. 52 At the same time,
the drug's purity rose.53 Between April 1988 and August 1989, Colombian law enforcement officials seized twenty-one tons of cocaine
and destroyed 300 processing laboratories. 54 However, when viewed
in terms of the price and quantity of cocaine available in the United
States, these actions had little effect. In August 1989, after the crackdown in Colombia, cocaine cost $11,000 per kilogram in Miami, close
55
to the United States' all-time low.
While Colombia remains a "democratic, pro-Western, very civilized, very capable, respectable country with good leaders, a constitution [and] good laws,"'5 6 it cannot effectively deal with the drug
trafficking industry. The Colombian judiciary's powerlessness in the
face of the cartel is the heart of the problem. Extraditing cartel members for trial in the United States becomes important only when Colombia itself cannot effectively arrest, try, and sentence cartel
members for their crimes. Thus, an analysis of extradition's importance in curbing the drug trafficking problem must begin with an examination of the debilitated Colombian judiciary.
The Colombian Judiciary'sImpotence: The Ochoa Incident

B.

By 1985, the cartel leaders recognized the judiciary to be the
48.
49.

Id.
Id. President Bush's campaign against drugs possesses goals largely identical to these

aims. Id.
50. Id at 26.
51. Id. Columbia currently produces more than seven times the amount of cocaine that
the United States market can afford. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The price of cocaine has risen intermittently in the past. After each Colombian
crackdown on trafficking, including the crackdown after Galan's assassination, the price of
cocaine rose and the supply dropped. See id.
56. Hearing: Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 15 (statement of Representative
Lawrence J. Smith, Chairman, Task Force on International Narcotics Control).
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weakest link in Colombian drug enforcement. 57 Colombian judges are
overworked, underpaid, badly protected, and heavily maligned by the
media and other public officials. 58 Representative Charles Rangel,
Chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
commenting on the intense pressure confronting Colombian jurists,
noted that "it is abundantly clear that either you are going to get
intimidated or you are going to be killed if you attempt to enforce the
law [in Colombia], especially the extradition laws."' 59 Desperately reacting to the violence, Colombia's 4,600 judges threatened to strike on
September 24, 1989, if the government did not provide them better
protection. 60 The judges repeated their earlier demands for bulletproof cars and vests, and guards with metal detectors at their offices,
61
as well as other precautions.
The circumstances surrounding the attempted extradition of
Jorge Luis Ochoa fully illustrate the truth of Representative Rangel's
statement. In the early 1980s, Ochoa emerged as one of the foremost
Medellin cartel kingpins. 62 In the autumn of 1984, Spanish law enforcement authorities identified Ochoa, together with another cartel
member, Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela, in Spain. 63 United States law
enforcement officials sought Ochoa pursuant to a south Florida indictment connecting him to illegal cocaine traffic through Nicaragua. 64 Additionally, law enforcement authorities in Los Angeles and
65
New York sought Rodriguez-Orejuela on drug trafficking warrants.
After their identification in Spain, the United States Department of
Justice prepared extradition requests for Ochoa and RodriguezOrejuela. 66 The Department of Justice forwarded the requests to the
Department of State, which, in turn, sent them to the United States
57.
58.
59.
60.

G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 244.
Id.
Hearing.Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 22.
L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, § 1, at 10, col. 3.

61.

Id.

62. See G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 85. Ochoa continues to possess a
lofty position in the cartel hierarchy. He is now chief executive officer of his family's cocaine
business. In terms of wealth, political influence, and "legal invincibility," he rivals Pablo Escobar Gaviria. Escobar is the leader of the Medellin cartel and possesses a personal fortune
estimated at $2 billion. See Church, supra note 21, at' 14.
63. G. GUGLIOTFiA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 190-91. Before their arrest, Spanish
police observed Ochoa and Rodriguez-Orejuela for two and a half months. Id. at 191.
64. Id. at 193.
65. Id. at 191.
66. Id.

964
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embassy in Madrid. 67 Spanish judicial police officers arrested Ochoa
and Rodriguez-Orejuela on November 15, 1984.68 Shortly after the
arrest, the United States requested extradition. 69
On January 15, 1985, the Colombian government submitted its
own request to the Spanish authorities for Ochoa's extradition to Colombia. 70 Colombia's extradition request charged Ochoa with falsifying a public document-namely, a license to import 128 Spanish bulls
into Cartagena, Colombia. 7 1 Ochoa's arrest and the possibility of his
extradition represented a major victory for Colombia and the United
States in their battles against the drug traffickers. It also provided a
great political victory for the Reagan administration. 72 Thus, United
States law enforcement authorities had a keen interest in extraditing
Ochoa and trying him in the United States before returning him to
3
Colombia for adjudication on the charges of bull smuggling."
The United States initially appeared to have a stronger position
than Colombia in Ochoa's extradition proceedings because drug trafficking was a more serious offense than bull smuggling. 74 At first,
Spanish authorities favored the United States' request, which had
been filed before the Colombian request.7 5 Ochoa's defense team recognized the United States' advantage. 76 In an attempt to undermine
that advantage, an Ochoa henchman sent an indictment to the Colombian district court in Medellin that was identical to the prior indictment against Ochoa in southern Florida. 77 As a result, Colombia
had two extradition requests to the United States' one, including a
request encompassing an offense just as serious as the United States'
67. Id.
68. Id. at 192. In addition to arresting Ochoa and Rodriguez-Orejuela, the Spanish judicial police arrested the men's wives. The Spanish authorities also froze all of their bank accounts and seized $90,000 cash found in their residences. Additionally, the judicial police
found an account book in Rodriguez-Orejuela's hotel room, detailing a 1983 sale involving
more than four metric tons of cocaine. Id.
69. Id. at 194. The Spanish government examined the United States' extradition documents and, on January 10, 1985, submitted them to the Spanish national court, the Audiencia
Nacional. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 192. Less than four months earlier, the United States government, in a criminal indictment, named Ochoa and the Medellin cartel criminal partners of the Nicaraguan
Sandinista government-a regime that the Reagan administration actively opposed. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 194-95.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 195.
77. Id.
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charge.7 8
On September 24, 1985, in extradition proceedings before the
Spanish Audiencia Nacional, or National Court, 79 Spanish judges
voted unanimously to deny the United States' extradition request.8 0
The United States immediately filed an appeal with the A udiencia Nacional.8 ' On appeal, seven of the Audiencia Nacional's judges examined the evidence pertaining to the extradition requests by the
United States and Colombia.82 After reviewing the appeal, the
A udiencia Nacional reversed itself by a vote of four to three, agreeing
to extradite Ochoa to the United States. 3 Ochoa's defense team then
appealed, charging that the prosecution's actions were unconstitutional.8 4 This time, the Audiencia Nacional again ruled in favor of the
Colombian extradition request.8 5 Accordingly, Spain extradited
Ochoa to Colombia pursuant to the Colombian bull smuggling
charge. 86
On August 1, 1986, after a lengthy delay, a court in Cartagena,
Colombia indicted Ochoa for the bull smuggling offense and re78. Id. Rodriguez-Orejuela used the same ploy. Id.
79. Spain's judicial system has no state or provincial subdivisions. Thus, the Audiencia
Nacional hears numerous cases that United States courts would parcel out among several different jurisdictions. Id. at 196.
80. Id. at 198. The basis for the Audiencia Nacional's denial of the United States' extradition request was "political context." The court noted that granting the United States extra-*
dition request could possibly aggravate Ochoa's situation because of "political considerations."
Id. The court further noted that a United States informant had testified against Ochoa in
exchange for a pardon of his ten-year sentence by the United States government. Id. Finally,
the A udiencia Nacional found that the connection between Ochoa and alleged cartel trafficking
activity in Nicaragua was unconvincing, given the animosity between the United States and
Nicaragua. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 199. In reversing its decision, the Audiencia Nacionalnoted that, in addition to
the American informant's testimony, the United States had presented evidence from two
agents. Further, the court ruled on the United States' argument linking Ochoa to cartel activity in Nicaragua, stating that animosity between the United States and Nicaragua should not
impede Ochoa's extradition. Id.
84. Id. at 255.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 257-58. In its final ruling, the Audiencia Nacional concluded that the Colombian extradition requests had greater weight than the United States' petitions. Id. at 258.
Although the United States made its request first, Colombia had two requests to the United
States' one. The court stated that because the charges in the requests were equally serious, the
deciding factor was nationality. The court reasoned that from a standpoint of "fundamental
rights," Ochoa would receive in Colombia a trial conducted in his native language. Furthermore, his prosecution would take place in a familiar environment where he could more easily
receive full judicial protection. Id.
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manded him to jail to await trial.87 On August 15, 1986, the court
found Ochoa guilty and sentenced him to twenty months in jail. 88
However, unknown to virtually everyone in the country, the presiding
judge had released Ochoa on 2.3 million pesos ($11,500) bond two
89
days before his trial.
In November 1987, Colombian police apprehended and booked
Ochoa for breaking parole and jumping bail on his bull smuggling
conviction. 90 Fearing that Ochoa might flee, thereby escaping all
charges, Colombian officials decided to hold Ochoa on the bull smuggling charge while they arranged for extradition to the United
States. 91 Responding to this fear, the United States government sent a
six-member legal team from the Departments of State and Justice to
help facilitate Ochoa's extradition. 92
Since the Colombian Supreme Court had declared the existing
extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia void in
94
1987, 93 there were no legally effective means of extraditing Ochoa.
As a result of this legal vacuum, Colombian officials had to delay the
extradition until they could reformulate the existing extradition documents in order to assemble some procedure that could expeditiously
get Ochoa to the United States. 95 During this delay, the United States
96
legal team left Colombia.
In December 1987, the leader of Ochoa's defense team,
Humberto Barrera, ironically a former justice of the Colombian
87.

Id.

88. Id. at 259.
89. Id. The judge who released Ochoa was Customs Judge Fabio Pastrana Hoyos. Id. at
258. Justice Minister Enrique Parejo Gonzalez had ordered Pastrana not to release Ochoa.

However, Pastrana did release Ochoa with the stipulation that he was to check in every two
weeks. Ochoa never checked in after his release. Id. at 258-59.
90. Id. at 310. Traffic police initially stopped Ochoa at a toll booth. Ochoa offered a 100
million peso ($400,000) bribe to the officers to release him, but the policemen did not accept
the bribe. Id. at 309-10.
91. See id. at 311. President Barco and his top advisors knew that Colombian law enforcement would have difficulty holding Ochoa. They decided to hold Ochoa pursuant to the
bull smuggling charge under the jurisdiction of the Cartagena customs judge. Id.
92. Id. at 311-12. In the eyes of the cartel, Ochoa's extradition was more serious than the
extradition of Carlos Lehder, another cartel kingpin. Ochoa was the leading provider for the
biggest crime family in Medellin and a close associate of Pablo Escobar, another cartel kingpin. Id. at 312-13.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
94. G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 311.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 315.
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Supreme Court, 9 7 met with Columbian judges regarding Ochoa's con-

finement. 98 On December 30, 1987, Barrera persuaded a Bogota
criminal court judge to sign a writ of habeas corpus for Ochoa. Barrera argued that if Ochoa's jail stints were aggregated, he would have
already served his sentence for the bull smuggling offense. 99 Ochoa's
legal team took Ochoa's writ to the prison in which Ochoa was jailed
and called for his release. Warden Alvaro Camacho attempted to
stall Ochoa's team, but eventually released Ochoa, stating that he had
no legal basis to hold Ochoa further.'°0 One commentator characterizing the events simply explains that "Ochoa bribed his way out" of
prison.10 1 After his release, Ochoa reportedly fled to Brazil. 102
In response to Ochoa's release, Robert S. Gelbard of the United
States Department of State commented that:
Ochoa's legally questionable release from prison is an indication of
the strength of the [drug] traffickers in Colombia. We do not
doubt that the highest levels of the Colombian Government were
sincerely looking for a way to legally extradite Ochoa ....
Let there be no doubt, however, that the Colombian Government confronts a formidable foe in the Medellin Cartel. And let
there be no doubt that the cartel fears extradition to stand trial
before US courts above all else. It is no secret that the cartel members have used their enormous wealth to corrupt Colombian judinot corrupt,
cial and governmental officials or, when they0 could
3
have intimidated officials to do their bidding.
97.

Id. at 314.

98.

Id. at 315.

99. Id. Barrera presented this argument in a meeting with Bogoti criminal court judge
Andres Martinez Montanez. Barrera stated that he had made this same point to the judge
who sat on the bull smuggling trial, in Cartagena, but that judge was now on vacation.
Montanez signed the writ of habeas corpus after hearing that no arrest orders were pending
against Ochoa. Id.
100. Id. While he stalled, Camacho called his superior, National Director of Prisons,
Guillermo Ferro. Ferro stated that he could not aid Camacho at that time because he was at
another prison trying to contain an uprising which had begun an hour earlier. Id.
101. Bagley, supra note 6, at 87. Robert S. Gelbard of the Department of State noted that:
[Ochoa] did not simply attempt to bribe the wardens or to shoot his way out of jail.
Instead, he sought, and eventually found, a judge willing to twist the law to provide a
legal fig leaf for his release. Unless Colombians can act in self-defense to prevent this
kind of perversion, the paralysis of their judicial system will solidify into reality.
Hearing: Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 34 (prepared statement of Robert S. Gelbard,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State).
102. G. GUGLIO-rFA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 316.
103. Hearing: Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 29-30 (prepared statement of Robert
S. Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State). After Ochoa's release, Washington ordered sanctions against Colombia, including ar-
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C

Extradition to the United States: The Cartel's Worst Nightmare
The United States Congress has recognized that the Medellin
cartel members' greatest fear is extradition to the United States.° 4 As
early as 1982, extradition quietly became the narcotraficantes'central
concern and the only thing that they feared.' 0 5 This is because once
extradited to the United States, cartel members cannot terrorize and
intimidate judges and juries with the ease that they can in their native
country.'°6

On another level, extradition plucks the trafficker from a familiar
society which looks on him as a part of daily life and places him in the
United States, a culture vehemently opposed to drug trafficking.
Once extradited, the narcotraficantemust contend with a judicial system whose processes are unfamiliar and implacable. Recognizing extradition's effectiveness, the United States and Colombia have actively
pursued extradition of the drug traffickers as a means of coping with
the cartel's violence, production, and distribution. Congress has articulated extradition's role in curtailing the drug problem. Benjamin
Gilman, co-chairperson of the House Task Force on International
Narcotics Control, recently stated that:
[i]f we are really going to convict any of these drug lords down
there, we are going to have to extradite them and get them back
here in our nation because it is apparent the courts down there [in
Colombia] cannot do it or are intimidated or are afraid of doing
it. 107

duous customs checks for travelers and products arriving in the United States. These actions
spurred nationalism and anti-United States sentiment in Colombia and led many Colombians
to believe that the United States did not understand the Colombian predicament. As recently
as early 1988, there existed little support in Colombia for a renewal of extraditions. In May
1988, Justice Minister Enrique Low Mutra announced that the Barco administration was
studying the possibility of unilaterally repudiating the treaty. Bagley, supra note 6, at 88.
104. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1989, § 1, at 11, col. 2. Gugliotta and Leen note that extradition would take
traffickers out of the familiar, malleable Colombian ambience and put them in a place
where judges spoke English, didn't investigate cases, and were treated like gods. The
whole legal system in the United States was different, and most Colombians thought,
merciless. Put a Colombian in a gringo court on drug charges, and he would be sent
away forever. In Colombia nobody wanted to try drug cases; in the United States it
seemed as though courts were competing for the opportunity.
G. GUGLiorrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 244-45.

105. G. GUGLIOrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 99. Gugliotta and Leen comment that
"[flor the traffickers, the extradition treaty was like a cross to a vampire; they came to hate and
fear it as they feared nothing on earth." Id. at 100.
106. Church, supra note 21, at 13.
107. Hearing: Recent Developments, supra note 19, at 22 (statement of Benjamin A.
Gilman, Co-Chairperson, Task Force on International Narcotics Control).
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The United States and Colombia may only pursue extradition
under a valid extradition treaty.' 0 8 Survival of the United States-Colombia extradition treaty in the face of pressure from the cartels and
the Colombian citizenry is a key issue, given the erratic and checkered
history of the instrument. A historical analysis of the treaty elucidates the cartel's fear of extradition, its vehement opposition to the
treaty, and the difficulty of pursuing extradition in the face of this

opposition.
D.

The United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty: Its Birth,
Death, and Resurrection
1. The Birth of the Treaty

In 1979, the United States and Colombia entered into the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic
of Colombia.1 °9 Following the treaty's signing, the Medellin cartel
mounted a propaganda campaign ° against its implementation."'
The campaign succeeded. By 1983, the United States had made dozens of requests for extradition under the treaty. However, Colombia's
then President Belisario Betancur did not sign a single extradition order. 112 In the fall of 1983, Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla initiated an arrest campaign of "extraditable" drug traffickers." 3 On
March 10, 1984, a joint raid by the DEA and the Colombian Police
seized 27,500 pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value of $1.2
billion. 1 4 At the time, this was the largest cocaine seizure on record." 5 The cartel retaliated by putting out a contract on Lara's
108. The United States will only pursue extradition if a valid treaty is in force. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3181 (1982). See id. for a list of extradition treaties to which the United States is a party.
109. Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia, Sept. 14, 1979, reprintedin I. I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, EXTRADmON LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED STATES 140.3 (1985) [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. The Extradition Treaty

was entered into force on March 4, 1982. It is not yet published in T.I.A.S. I. I. KAVASS & A.
SPRUDZS, supra, at 140.1.
110.

G. GUGLIOTTA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 245-46. The propaganda campaign fo-

cused on cultural differences and racism. The cartel claimed that it was impossible for a Colombian to obtain a fair trial in the United States. The cartel stated that the DEA and the
media had stereotyped Colombians as "wiry, beady-eyed little brown men and savage killers."
Id. at 245.
111. Riding, Cocaine Billionaires,N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 8, 1987, at 30.
112. Id. President Betancur took office in 1982 with misgivings about conducting an active war on drugs. He refused, on nationalistic grounds, to honor the treaty, preferring to try
Colombian drug traffickers in Colombia. Bagley, supra note 6, at 81.
113. Riding, supra note 111, at 32.
114. Bagley, supra note 6, at 81.
115. Id.
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life. 116 Medellin cartel hitmen assassinated Lara on April 30, 1984.117
In response to the public outrage caused by this shooting, President Betancur's government declared war on the traffickers. Betancur

invoked state-of-siege powers that produced a wave of arrests, confiscations of property, and destruction of drug-processing labs.' 18 Over
the next thirty months, Betancur signed, and the Colombian Supreme
Court approved, extradition orders for thirteen traffickers. In response, the cartel killed thirteen judges.'19

2.

The Death of the Treaty

On November 19, 1985, guerrillas of the left-wing group, M-19
(April 19 Movement) in alliance with the drug cartels, seized the Palace of Justice in BogotA and destroyed the office that handled extraditions.120 The M-19 group is a leftist guerrilla organization that was
established on April 19, 1970.121 The group claims to consist of revolutionary nationalists committed to democracy and people's rights in
Colombia. 122 The ensuing battle between the M-19 guerrillas and the
army killed one hundred people, including eleven justices of the Co123
lombian Supreme Court.
On December 12, 1986, the Colombian Supreme Court declared
the treaty's enabling legislation unconstitutional on the ground that
an interim president, and not the president of Colombia himself, had
signed the legislation into effect. 124 On December 14, 1986, newly116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Riding, supra note 111, at 32. Betancur's crackdown forced some of the cartel leaders to go into hiding in Panama, where they paid Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega
between four and five million dollars for protection. Bagley, supra note 6, at 82. Jorge Ochoa
and Pablo Escobar, two of Colombia's most powerful exiled kingpins, contacted former Colombian president Lopez, who was in Panama at the time and denied that they precipitated the
Lara killing. Ochoa and Escobar claimed to control seventy to eighty percent of the South
American cocaine traffic and offered to withdraw from the business, get out of politics, and
repatriate billions of dollars back to Colombia. In exchange, Ochoa and Escobar sought
reincorporation into Colombian society. In a secret meeting in Panama City on May 28, 1984,
Ochoa and Escobar suggested to Attorney General Carlos Jiminez Gomez that the extradition
treaty be revised to bar retroactive prosecution. Id.
119. Riding, supra note 111, at 32. Seventeen suspected drug traffickers were extradited
from Colombia to the United States between January 1985 and February 1987. L.A. Times,
Aug. 19, 1989, § 1, at 11, cols. 2-3.
120. Welch, supra note 14, at 67-68.
121. Id. at 68 n.164.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 68.
124. G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 300; see Bagley, supra note 6, at 85. Then
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elected President Virgilio Barco Vargas signed the treaty, bringing it
back into effect.1 25 On February 4, 1987, Colombian police captured
Carlos Lehder, one of the most ruthless and feared cartel members,
1 26
and extradited him directly to United States authorities in Florida.
Lehder's arrest and extradition was the high point of Colombia's campaign against the Medellin cartel. However, Lehder's extradition,
which the cartel must have viewed as an example of its potential27 fate,
also served to cement the cartel's resolve to defeat the treaty.
In June 1987, the Colombian Supreme Court again bowed to the
cartel's intimidation and threats by holding that the treaty's enabling
28
legislation was unconstitutional, despite Barco's re-signing.
Although Barco promised to continue the extradition campaign, the
Colombian Supreme Court's action postponed extradition proceed29
ings indefinitely.'
president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala agreed to the treaty in 1979. However, a minister of
government, rather than Turbay himself, signed the treaty into effect. See generally Worldwide
Review of Status of US. Extradition Treaties and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearing
before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62
(1987) (statement of Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State) [hereinafter Hearing: Worldwide Review].
125. Bagley, supra note 6, at 85.
126. Welch, supra note 14, at 69.
127. Id. at 70.
128. G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 301. The cartel filed nine lawsuits challenging President Barco's power to re-sign the treaty's enabling legislation back into effect.
The suits stated that Barco had either exceeded his authority or should be required to submit
the enabling legislation to the Colombian Congress for ratification. See Bagley, supra note 6,
at 87. The constitutional challenge to the treaty split the 24-member Colombian Supreme
Court 12 to 12 in April 1987. Welch, supra note 14, at 70. Colombian law provides that an
independent judge may cast the deciding vote in the event of a deadlock in the supreme court.
Three of the four judges selected to break the tie declined to participate. Id. In June 1987,
however, a selected judge voted against the treaty, thereby invalidating it. Id. Gugliotta and
Leen state that the moment the treaty's survival depended on the ruling of a single person, in
this case the alternate justice, the treaty was doomed. G. GUGLIOTFA & J. LEEN, supra note
1, at 304.
129. Bagley, supra note 6, at 85. The future of extradition in Colombia appeared grim, as
reflected by the following excerpt from a congressional report on narcotics control.
It would appear that the possibility of reviving the 1979 extradition treaty between
the United States and Colombia, which was invalidated in 1987 by an intimidated
Supreme Court, is virtually nil in the near future. The perceived costs to Colombian
society of revisiting the extradition issue are viewed as too great for society to bear.
A further obstacle to implementing the extradition treaty is the extreme legalistic
nature of Colombian institutions: both the Supreme Court and the Congress can declare the actions of a President illegal, the Council of State can challenge the actions
of all three, and the Attorney General can declare the actions of any of the previous
four illegal. However, the study mission was informed that if a state of siege were
declared in Colombia, extradition would be legally permissible.
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS IN PERU, Bo-
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The Treaty's Resurrection: The Galan Assassination and
Subsequent Extraditions

The violence continued on August 18, 1989, when gunmen killed
Senator Luis Carlos Galan, the leading presidential candidate in Colombia's May 1990 presidential election, and an outspoken opponent
of the drug cartels.1 30 Responding to the assassination, President Virgilio Barco Vargas resurrected the treaty through his state-of-siege
powers, 1 3' in an emergency decree on August 19, 1989.132 With this
33
act, Barco vowed to drive the drug traffickers from his country.
Barco's use of his state-of-siege powers allowed him to extradite
cartel members to the United States without first obtaining a judge's
signature on the extradition order. 134 The first Medellin cartel member's extradition after the treaty's reinstatement occurred on September 13, 1989. On that date, Colombia extradited Eduardo Martinez
Romero, the reputed money manager for the Medellin cartel, to the
United States. 3 5 Law enforcement officials in Atlanta, Georgia purLIVIA, COLOMBIA, AND MEXICO: AN UPDATE, H.R. Doc. No. 382-12, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
25 (1989).
130. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5. Galan's assassination came only a few
hours after gunmen killed a police chief in Medellin. Galan was a Colombian senator and
prot~gi of current president Virgilio Barco Vargas. Church, supra note 21, at 12.
131. Riding, supra note Ill, at 30.
132. L.A. Times, Aug. 23, 1989, § 1, at 10, col. 2. The day after Galan's assassination,
President Bush released the following statement:
Last night President Barco announced a number of actions aimed at narcotics traffickers including the reinstatement of the extradition treaty between the U.S. and
Colombia which had been suspended by the nation's courts. He is using his powers
under Colombia's state of siege to do so. I welcome this courageous move by President Barco. The U.S. is ready to coordinate the extradition of these criminals as
expeditiously as possible. I have instructed the Departments of State and Justice to
begin working on this immediately.
Statement on the Assassination of Luis Carlos Galan and the Reinstatement of the ColombiaU.S. Extradition Treaty, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1261 (Aug. 19, 1989).
133. Serrill, Passing the Extradition Test, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 48. The Medellin cartel's actions directly following Barco's resurrection of the treaty affected the mindset of the
Colombian citizenry. Colombians looked to Galan as a symbol of hope, much as United States
citizens viewed Robert F. Kennedy. After the assassination and Barco's actions, the traffickers
bombed newspapers, political party headquarters, schools, restaurants, and shopping centers.
This strategy purposefully victimized ordinary Colombians. As a result, Colombian newspapers reported that many people felt that the government could not fight the traffickers. They
also felt that a government in this state should not have provoked the cartel. Rosenberg, supra
note 7, at 30-31.
134. See Church, supra note 21, at 13.
135. Serrill, supra note 133, at 48. United States law enforcement officials exulted in this
extradition. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh stated, "I applaud the extraordinary
courage of President Virgilio Barco and the government of Colombia in their effort to restore
the rule of law." Id.
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sued Martinez for his involvement in a $1.2 billion money laundering
operation. 3 6 Responding to this action against Martinez, cartel
gunmen murdered a former investigator with the Colombian attorney
general's office, the wife of a Colombian police major, and the wife of
37
a Colombian intelligence officer.'
The next extradition occurred on October 14, 1989. In that proceeding, Colombia extradited Bernardo Pelaez Roldan, Ana Rodriguez de Tamayo, and Roberto Carlini Arrico, three more members of
the Medellin cartel. 38 Additionally, on October 29, 1989, Colombia
sent Jose Abello Silva, the Medellin cartel's "master smuggler" and
the fifth most important drug trafficking suspect ever extradited from
139
Colombia, from Bogoti to the United States to await trial.
III.

THE MECHANICS OF INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION'

4°

Extradition's historical background illustrates its position in facilitating the prosecution of narcotraficantes. After Colombia has
captured a drug trafficker, successful extradition under international
law depends on two factors. First, the treaty must be in force before
the United States and Colombia may pursue extradition proceedings.
Second, the two countries must follow the treaty's provisions in effecting extradition.
International extradition involves intergovernmental legal assistance in the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenders.' 4 ' A
requested government, pursuant to treaty obligations or an act of international comity, sends a fugitive to the requesting state to stand
trial for offenses for which the fugitive is charged. 42 In the United
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 1989, § 1, at Al, col. 6.
139. L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1989, § 1, at A4, col. 4.
140. The following section will address international extradition issues using the United
States and Colombia as a model.
141.

M.C. BASSIouNI,

INTERNATIONAL

ExTRADmoN, UNITED STATES LAW AND

PRACTICE 319 (1987).

142. Hearing: Worldwide Review, supra note 124, at 6-7 (statement of Mary V. Mochary,
Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State). Mochary defines extradition as:
The process whereby a requested government, pursuant to a treaty obligation or as
an act of international comity, sends a fugitive to the requesting state to stand trial on
offenses for which he is charged. In general, extradition of a fugitive is done pursuant to bilateral extradition treaties which establish a reciprocal obligation to extradite
fugitives from the requested treaty partner to the requesting treaty partner. Extradition treaties define the scope of the obligation to extradite (eg., defining extraditable
offenses, setting forth exceptions to extradition) and set up procedural mechanisms
whereby extradition can be carried out (e.g., describing the documents and evidence
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States, the federal government has sole authority over international
extradition. 143 As with most common law countries, the United
States does not pursue extradition in the absence of a treaty.'" Extradition treaties define the scope of the obligation to extradite. 145 In
most cases, the document defines extraditable offenses, sets forth exceptions to extradition, and describes procedural mechanisms through
which extradition may occur. 146
The extradition process in the United States begins with an application for extradition to the United States Secretary of State.147 If a
state court has jurisdiction over the offense, the governor must make
the request. 14 8 If the offense violates federal law, the United States
Attorney General must make the request. 149 The application must
allege that the individual sought has committed one of the offenses
that the treaty defines and that the fugitive is located in the requested

country. 150 The Secretary of State then may decide whether the offense calls for extradition.151 If the Secretary of State decides the circumstances warrant extradition, the Secretary will route the request
to the Colombian government.
As the Medellin cartel's conduct illustrates, drug trafficking activities often cross international borders. 152 Indeed, in some cases,
the traffickers may commit crimes in countries where they have never
been. 153 In other cases, the traffickers may flee to countries where
required for extradition, providing for the provisional arrest of fugitives expected to

flee) ....
Id.
143. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407, 408 (1886); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982) (list of extradition treaties in which the United States is a

party).
145. Hearing: Worldwide Review, supra note 124.
146. Id.
147. Barnett, Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat Drug Trafficking, 15 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 285, 299 (1985).
148. Id. at 299 n.107.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 299.
151. Id.
152. Hearing: Worldwide Review, supra note 124, at 6 (statement of Mary V. Mochary,
Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).
153. Id. In characterizing the scope of the contemporary criminal, Mochary notes that:
The activities of modem criminals-whether drug traffickers, "white collar
criminals", terrorists or others---extend across international borders and such
criminals do not respect the sovereign boundaries or authorities of any country.
Sometimes their crimes are committed in countries where they have never been actually present. Other times they flee to countries where no crimes have been committed. Extradition of such criminals to a country with criminal charges pending
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they have committed no crimes.154 Further, narcotics traffickers often
use international financial transactions to conceal their profits.15 5
Therefore, while the Medellin cartel has its headquarters in Colombia,
the repercussions from its activities can extend around the globe. In
addition, due to the cartel members' great wealth, international travel
poses no problem, allowing them to further the international drug
56
trade and making flight more likely.
These factors, coupled with the cartel's stranglehold on the Colombian judiciary, help illustrate the importance of extradition in the
prosecution of drug traffickers. In plain terms, the Medellin cartel
members are analogous to a cancer which has already overtaken Colombia and stands poised to spread. International extradition represents the mechanism that can surgically remove this cancer from
Colombia, where trial and prosecution remain unlikely. It will also
place the cartel members on trial in the United States, a venue where
they cannot affect the outcome of the proceedings.
In extraditing members of the Medellin cartel, one must recognize that extradition requires the cooperation of both the United
States and Colombia. Colombian law enforcement authorities must
pursue and capture wanted cartel members. At the same time, United
States law enforcement agencies must successfully develop cases
against the traffickers. These agencies include the United States Department of Justice, the United States Attorneys' offices, federal investigative agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the United States Marshal's Service, the
United States Customs Service, and local law enforcement

authorities. 157
The foundation of the United States' effort to extradite the
Medellin cartel members is adherence to general principles and proceagainst them becomes an important part of international cooperation in anti-criminal
activity.

Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 29 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division). Richard notes that it is inevitable that most major drug trafficking cases will
have an international aspect. Id. First, since cocaine is not produced in the United States, it
must be imported. Therefore, it is common for evidence, defendants, or both to be located
outside the United States. Second, drug traffickers use international financial transactions both
to launder and to conceal profits from their activities. Third, international flight to avoid
prosecution is relatively easy for drug traffickers. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 11 (statement of Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of
State).
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dures of international extradition. Two principles that act as cornerstones of international extradition law are "dual criminality" and
"specialty." 58
A.

Dual Criminality

1. The Doctrine of Dual Criminality
The doctrine of dual criminality provides that no offense is extraditable unless it is a crime in both the country requesting extradition
and the country from which extradition is requested.1 59 Thus, if the
United States desires to extradite a cartel member, both United States
and Colombian law must classify the defendant's conduct as criminal.
The doctrine attempts to safeguard the defendant's liberty from restriction for offenses not recognized as criminal in the requested country. 160 The doctrine benefits the defendant in that he or she can avoid
if
prosecution in the state where the offense was allegedly committed 61
the extraditing nation does not deem the same conduct criminal.
Dual criminality is, in essence, a reciprocity requirement intended to
assure each nation that it can rely on corresponding treatment of its
citizens when one of the requesting nation's own nationals becomes a
62
target of extradition.1
Section 3 of article 2 of the United States-Colombia extradition
treaty embodies the principle of dual criminality, stating that:
Extradition shall be granted in respect of an extraditable offense
only if the offense is punishable under the laws of both Contracting
158. "The principle of 'double criminality' and the doctrine of 'specialty' are the most
fundamental doctrines of international extradition law." Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman, InternationalExtradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 353, 354 (1985) [herein-

after Bernholz].
159. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 280 (1933); Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309, 311 (1921); Kelly v. Griffen, 241 U.S. 6 (1915); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217
(1904).
160. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 n.5 (1971).
161. M.C. BASSlOUNI, supra note 141, at 325-26.

162. Barnett, supra note 147, at 300. In considering dual criminality, Bassiouni
comments:
"Double criminality" is in effect a reciprocity requirement which is intended to ensure each of the respective states that they (and the relator) can rely on corresponding treatment, and that no state shall use its processes to surrender a person for
conduct which it does not characterize as criminal. The requirement of "double
criminality" does, of course, benefit the relator, insofar as he can avoid the processes
of justice of the state in which the conduct was allegedly committed, if (depending on
the interpretative formula) the same conduct is not also deemed criminal in the requested state.
M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 141, at 325-26.
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Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period exceeding one year.
However, when the request for extradition relates to a person who
has been convicted and sentenced, extradition shall be granted only
if the duration of the penalty still to be served amounts to at least
six months. 163

While the treaty does list extraditable offenses, these items constitute
only one category of prohibited behavior. First, a particular offense is
extraditable only when a party can show that the defendant's crime
falls within one of the listed categories. For instance, the United
States may pursue an individual for a jewel theft committed in New
York City. In order for this theft to constitute an extraditable offense,
the United States must show that the act was "robbery" as defined in
the treaty. Second, the United States must also show that both Co64
lombian and United States laws categorize jewel theft as criminal.1
2.

Dual Criminality and Extraditable Offenses

Without regard to the legal basis for extradition, the alleged offense for which extradition is requested must appear among the
treaty's enumerated extraditable offenses. 165 Thus, three institutions
must consider the alleged offense criminal-United States law, Colombian law, and the treaty. The treaty's appendix provides a list of
extraditable offenses. Among the listed offenses appear several classes
of conduct relevant to the drug trafficking offense. They are:
(21) Offenses against the laws relating to the traffic in, possession,
or production or manufacture of, narcotic drugs, cannabis, hallucinogenic drugs, cocaine and its derivatives, and other substances
which produce physical or psychological dependence ....
(22) Offenses against public health, such as the illicit manufacture
163. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 2(3), at 140.3.
164. See Bernholz, supra note 158, at 356. When the extradition treaty lists extraditable
offenses, one must not confuse this list with the principle of dual criminality. For example, the
extradition treaty may list "sexual relations with a minor" in its extraditable offenses. This
item only constitutes "a category of prohibited behavior to which the specific crime must be
applied." Id. The listed offenses in the extradition treaty do not make a particular crime
extraditable until that crime meets two criteria. First, the crime must be shown to fall within
one of the extradition treaty's listed categories. Second, the crime must be punishable in the
requested country. Id.
165. M.C. BAssIOUNI, supra note 141, at 328. Bassiouni states that two rationales support
the designation of extraditable offenses. First, defining extraditable offenses avoids using a
cumbersome and costly procedure like extradition for minor offenses. Second, defining extraditable offenses avoids having the requested state decline surrender of the offender on public
policy grounds because the requested state does not classify the conduct as criminal. Id. at
333.
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of or traffic in chemical products or substances injurious to health
(35) Any offense against the laws relating to international trade
166
and transfers of funds.

However, it should be noted that the treaty does not define the
extraditable offenses as criminal under Colombian or United States
law, but only names the offenses and establishes formulas for identifying them. 67 Therefore, the body determining whether or not to extradite the offender, usually an extradition magistrate, must apply
substantive criminal law to the offense in determining whether the
conduct is extraditable. 68 For example, the treaty classifies murder
as extraditable. 169 However, lawful extradition for murder will only
result when the United States can show that the defendant has committed murder under United States and Colombian law. The extradition magistrate in Colombia must apply principles of Colombian
criminal law to determine whether the act committed, the alleged
murder, constitutes an extraditable offense.
In ruling on diverse extradition issues, the United States Supreme
Court and the circuit courts of appeal have determined the scope and
effect of the dual criminality requirement. In Collins v. Loisel, 7 0 the
Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of dual criminality does not
require that the definition of the defendant's conduct in the requested
and requesting state possess exactly the same characteristics."' Classification of the conduct as criminal under each country's law satisfies
the dual criminality doctrine.172 Article 2, section 2 of the treaty
166. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, app. at 140.11-.12.
167. M.C. BAssIoUNI, supra note 141, at 336. Extraditable offenses are interpreted in
either of two ways. On one hand, the nations may require that the offense charged be identical
to the offense listed in the extradition treaty. On the other hand, the party states could require
only that the conduct that supports the charge correspond to an offense listed in the extradition treaty. Id. at 329.
168. Id. at 336.
169. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, app. at 140.13.
170. 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
171. See In re Edmondson, 352 F. Supp. 22 (D. Minn. 1972) ("minor variances in the
technical definition of the crime are not fatal").
172. The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the
two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular
act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.
Collins, 259 U.S. at 312. Collins was charged with obtaining property by false pretenses. Indian authorities sought extradition of Collins to India from the United States. The British
Consul General's affidavit charged Collins with "cheating." Id. at 311. Collins argued that
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reflects this concept, stating that "[flor the purposes of this Article, it
does not matter whether or not the laws of the Contracting Parties
place the offenses or denominate an offense by the same terminology. '"173 This section focuses on whether acts performed in the
United States constituting an offense also legally constitute an offense
under Colombian laws. Article 2 also considers whether the offense
under evaluation remains extraditable under the treaty, regardless of
the actual offense charged by the requested state. 174 The requested
state, here Colombia, examines the category and type of offense
charged to determine a counterpart under its own laws. 75
In Factor v. Laubenheimer, 76 the United States Supreme Court
expanded the scope of dual criminality as defined in Collins.177 In this
case, Great Britain sought extradition of Factor from the United
States for knowingly receiving fraudulently-obtained money. 178 The
extradition proceedings took place in Illinois, where Factor lived and
committed the offense. 179 Factor argued that because Illinois criminal
law did not specifically cover the offense for which Great Britain
sought extradition, his extradition violated dual criminality and
should be voided.'8 0 The Court disagreed with Factor's argument
and upheld the extradition.'"'
The Factor Court first recognized the requirement of dual criminality-that "an offense is extraditable only if the acts charged are
criminal by the laws of both countries."' 182 In discussing extradition
treaty interpretation, the Court stated that, where two possible conflicting constructions exist, courts should avoid a narrow interpretation in favor of a liberal one.' 83 Thus, the Court concluded that
this offense was not in the list of offenses enumerated in the United States-Great Britain extra-

dition treaty. He claimed that this offense differed from the offense of obtaining property by
false pretenses. The Court upheld Collins' extradition. Id at 317.
173. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 2(2), at 140.3.
174.

See M.C. BASSIOUN1, supra note 141, at 329.

175.
176.

See id.
290 U.S. 276 (1933).

177.
178.

M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 141, at 337.
Factor,290 U.S. at 276.

179.

Id. at 282.

180.

Id.

181.

Id.

182. Id. at 280.
183. The Court's exact words were:
In choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and
restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed
controlling in the interpretation of international agreements. Considerations which
should govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of trea-
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principles controlling the interpretation of international agreements,
diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith inherent in
the establishment and use of treaties require a liberal interpretation of
the extradition treaty's provisions.184 This sort of liberal construction, according to the Court, would give effect to the parties' intention
to ensure equality and reciprocity.18 5 In subsequently evaluating the
Factor analysis, one court has stated that "the courts must approach
challenges to extradition with a view towards finding the offenses
86
within the treaty."'
Thus, under the Factor analysis, if a gray area exists as to
whether a defendant's crime could be considered extraditable or
nonextraditable, liberal construction of article 2 pushes courts toward
construing the conduct as extraditable. 8 7 In essence, Factor mandates that in interpreting articles 2 or 3, any "close calls" should be
resolved in favor of extradition. Despite traditional recognition of
dual criminality as "central to extradition law,"' 8 8 authorities have
noted that the dual criminality requirement possesses limited potency
89
as a weapon with which to challenge extradition.
3.

Dual Criminality and Predicate Offense Crimes

Dual criminality assumes a more immediate importance in extraties, as well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect
the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.
For that reason, if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the
rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it,
the more liberal
construction is to be preferred.
Factor, 290 U.S. at 293.
184. Id.
185. Id. The Court also stated that treaty interpretation often entails looking beyond the
written words to the negotiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties
regarding the treaty and to the parties' own practical considerations of it. Id. at 294-95.
186. McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F. Supp. 42, 48 (S.D. Fla. 1981); see United States v. Wiebe,
733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984) ("extradition treaties are to be construed liberally to effect
their purpose," which the court defined as "the surrender of fugitives"); Brauch v. Raiche, 618
F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1980) (dual criminality requirement met even if the state where the defendant resides is the only state in which the act is illegal).
187. Article 2, section 2 states that, "[flor the purposes of this Article, it shall not matter
whether or not the laws of the Contracting Parties place the offense within the same category
of offenses or denominate an offense by the same terminology." Extradition Treaty, supra note
109, art. 2(2), at 140.3. Article 2, section 3 states that "[e]xtradition shall be granted in respect
of an extraditable offense only if the offense is punishable under the laws of both Contracting
Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period exceeding one year ....
" Id. art. 2(3), at 140.3.
188. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1461
(1988). Kester states that the dual criminality requirement has little meaning, largely because
court opinions have limited the requirement and applied it inconsistently. Id.
189. Brauch, 618 F.2d at 847.

Medel:h Cocaine Cartel

1991]

dition involving federal, rather than state offenses. 190 Due to the international character of the Colombian narcotics traffickers' activities,
federal prosecutors file most of the charges against the traffickers in
federal court. Accordingly, federal prosecutors may take advantage
of any number of federal statutes in prosecuting the traffickers. Drafters have structured these federal statutory crimes, such as the predicate offense crimes, much differently than their common law
antecedents. 191 Because of this difference in structure, the laws of for9 2
eign countries often possess no direct counterpart.1
Thus, the dual criminality doctrine assumes an especially important role where authorities request extradition for a crime containing
several separately recognized predicate offenses, such as the Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") 93 and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 94 Recognition of the
predicate crimes (the included offenses that comprise the entire offense) does not automatically make the comprehensive offense extraditable. This is so because dual criminality requires that the offense as
195
a whole must be punishable in the requested country.
Colombia may punish some or all of the predicate crimes contained in predicate offense crimes. However, it may not punish a foreign United States offense, such as RICO or CCE, composed of
several separately punishable offenses. 96 Because CCE and RICO
are uniquely United States offenses, a cartel member fighting extradition may argue that Colombia may not extradite him because these
crimes do not constitute extraditable offenses under the treaty.
United States courts, however, have examined and disposed of the
argument with respect to CCE, finding that the treaty does encompass
CCE. 197 In United-States v. Lehder-Rivas, 98 the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida stated that the treaty
190.

Kester, supra note 188, at 1462.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193.

21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).

A drug offender, convicted in the United States, faces a

sentence of not less than 20 years, and as long as life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Id.
194.
(1982).

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968

195. See Bernholz, supra note 158, at 358.
196. Id.
197. See United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (upheld offender's extradition for CCE
even though the treaty did not specifically list this offense).
198. 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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"may be reasonably construed to include participation in a continuing
' 99
criminal enterprise as an offense subject to extradition."'
A further possibility in the extradition of drug traffickers is the
treaty's failure to list several important offenses connected to the production and trafficking of cocaine. The treaty covers extradition for
straightforward narcotics trafficking offenses. However, it does not
specifically list important related crimes, such as money laundering 2O
and currency and tax evasion offenses, which pertain to the financial
aspects of the narcotics trafficking and the profits it generates. 20
United States court decisions have viewed these offenses, particularly
money laundering offenses, as extraditable.
B.

Specialty

In the context of international extradition, the doctrines of dual
criminality and specialty operate arm in arm. In fact, offenders subject to extradition most often claim treaty rights under the specialty
doctrine. 20 2 While the dual criminality doctrine states that the extradited defendant must have committed an offense classified as criminal
in both nations, 20 3 the specialty doctrine provides that the requesting
nation may not prosecute the extradited defendant for any offense
2 °4
other than that for which the surrendering state agreed to extradite.
20 5
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Rauscher,
defined specialty, stating that:
[A] person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the
court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only
be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the
199. Id. at 1529.
200. The Schedule of Offenses, contained in the appendix to the treaty, lists as extraditable
offense number 35 "[a]ny offense against the laws relating to international trade and transfers
of funds." Although this offense does not specifically refer to money laundering, it appears
that federal prosecutors would argue that this definition encompasses the money laundering
offense. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, at 140.12.
201. Hearing: Worldwide Review, supra note 124, at 27 (statement of Mark M. Richard,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division). Many countries have resisted extradition for "fiscal" offenses, such as money laundering, tax evasion, and currency crimes. Prosecutors frequently use these crimes to attack drug traffickers. Id.
202. Kester, supra note 188, at 1467.
203. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 311 (1921).
204. Restated, the principle of specialty means that the requesting state, which secures the
surrender of the offender, can prosecute that person only for the offense for which he or she
was surrendered by the requested state, or allow that person an opportunity to leave the prosecuting state. M.C. BASSIOUNI,supra note 141, at 359-60.
205. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him,
after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country

from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those
proceedings.206
Specialty is considered a privilege of the requested state, and is
designed to protect its dignity and interests. 20 7 It rests on five broad
foundational themes. First, the requested state can refuse extradition
if it knows that the requesting state will prosecute the defendant for
an offense other than the extradited offense. Second, the requesting
state would not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, but for
the requested state's surrender of the defendant. Third, the requesting state cannot prosecute the defendant without securing his surrender from the requested state. Fourth, the requesting state may not
abuse a formal process to secure the surrender of the defendant by
relying on the requested state. And fifth, the requested state undertakes extradition in reliance on the representation of the requesting
state. 208 The extradition treaty between Colombia and the United
States incorporates the specialty doctrine. 2°9
1. Circumventing the Specialty Doctrine
Specialty could arise in various situations in the extradition of
cartel members. First, in post-extradition criminal proceedings in the
United States, prosecutors may wish to try the defendant on a crimi206. Id. at 430.
207. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973).
208. M.C. BAssIouNI, supra note 141, at 360.
209. Article 15 of the treaty states:
(1) A person extradited under the Treaty shall not be detained, tried or punished in
the territory of the Requesting State for an offense other than that for which extradition has been granted, nor be extradited by that State to a third State, unless:
(a) That person has left the territory of the Requesting State after that person's extradition and has voluntarily returned to it; or
(b) That person has not left the territory of the Requesting State within 60 days after
being free to do so; or
(c) The Executive Authority of the Requested State has consented to that person's
detention, trial, or punishment for another offense, or to extradition to a third State,
provided that the principles of Article 4 of this Treaty shall be observed.
(2) If the offense for which the person was extradited is legally altered in the course
of the proceedings, that person may be prosecuted or sentenced provided:
(a) The offense under the new legal description is based on the same set of facts
contained in the extradition request and its supporting documents, and
(b) The defendant is subject to be sentenced to a period of incarceration which does
not exceed that provided for the offense for which that person was extradited.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 15, at 140.8.
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nal offense not listed in the extradition request. On its face, specialty
bars such prosecution. Second, after the defendant has been extradited for a criminal offense, the United States may wish to prosecute
the cartel member for a civil offense. Again, this prosecution appears
to be precluded by the doctrine of specialty. United States courts
have confronted these issues and presented some detours around a
strict reading of the specialty requirements.
a.

The Separate Offense: United States v. Paroutian

In 1962, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Paroutian,210 held
that formal differences between the extradition request and the actual
indictment do not violate the specialty doctrine. 2 "1 This is because
specialty applies to the substantive nature of the crime and not to the
underlying facts supporting extradition.212
Initially, the United States indicted Paroutian for knowingly and
unlawfully receiving and concealing heroin and for conspiring to import the drug into the United States. 21 3 Lebanon extradited Paroutian
to the United States to answer the indictment. 214 Paroutian subsequently challenged his extradition. 21 5 Paroutian's extradition papers
included a copy of an indictment issued in the Southern District of
New York. 2 16 However, he later stood trial pursuant to an indictment
issued in the Eastern District of New York. 21 7 Paroutian used the
two different indictments to argue that his extradition was invalid for
violating specialty. 218 The court of appeals disagreed, stating that specialty, as set out in Rauscher, focuses on protecting "the extraditing
21 9
government against abuse of its discretionary act of extradition.1
The court recognized that specialty "would forbid trial of Paroutian
for murder or some other offense totally unrelated to the traffic in
narcotics. ' ' 22° However, it stated that the test for whether trial relates
to a separate offense (an offense upon which specialty would bar trial)
"should not be some technical refinement of local law, but whether
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id.
M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 141, at 365 n.129.
Paroutian,299 F.2d at 487.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id.
Paroutian,299 F.2d at 490.
Id.

220. Id.
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the extraditing country would consider the offense actually tried
'separate.' "221
Hence, attacks on extradition based on specialty must establish
that Colombia would consider the offense separate from that defined
in the extradition papers. For extradited cartel members, Paroutian
indicates that federal prosecutors may at least argue that violations
related to the offense contained in the defendant's extradition papers
may be prosecuted. In addition, Paroutian suggests that extradited
cartel members may not argue that procedural missteps, such as mismatched indictments, should block extradition on the basis of
specialty.
b.

The Consent Exception: United States v. Najohn

Judicial efforts at limiting the effect of the specialty doctrine did
not end with Paroutian. In United States v. Najohn,222 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant may stand trial on a charge separate from
the extradited offense if the requested country consents.
Najohn was originally indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on several counts of interstate transportation of stolen property. 223 The United States embassy in Bern, Switzerland requested
Najohn's extradition to the United States. 224 Swiss police arrested
Najohn and the Swiss government extradited him to the United States
225
pursuant to the United States-Switzerland extradition treaty.
of the Pennsylvania
Najohn subsequently pleaded guilty to one count
226
indictment and received a four-year sentence.
While serving the Pennsylvania sentence, the Northern District
of California indicted Najohn on three additional offenses: interstate
transportation of stolen property, receipt of stolen property, and con221. Id. at 490-91. Under this test, the Second Circuit did not believe that Lebanon, fully
cognizant of the facts surrounding the case, would consider that Paroutian was tried for anything besides the offense for which he was extradited. See United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d
1417, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989) ("the appropriate test is whether
the extraditing country would consider the acts for which the defendant was prosecuted as
independent from those for which he was extradited").
222. 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
223. Id. Najohn's alleged offenses violated 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982). Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. For full text of the United States-Swiss extradition treaty, see Treaty between the
United States and Switzerland for the Extradition of Criminals, May 14, 1900, 31 Stat. 1928,
T.S. No. 354.
226. Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1421.
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spiracy. 227 The Magistrate of the District of Zurich and the Swiss
ambassador to the United States requested prosecution, 228 agreeing to
suspend specialty. 2 29 Arguing against the California indictment,
Najohn nevertheless cited the specialty doctrine and moved to
230
dismiss.
In considering Najohn's arguments, the Ninth Circuit noted that
specialty usually bars prosecution for offenses other than those for
which the defendant was originally extradited. 23' However, the court
addressed the specialty doctrine's "specific exception. '2 32 Under this
exception, the extradited individual may stand trial for a crime other
than that for which he was surrendered "if the asylum country consents.' ' 2 33 Because the Swiss authorities manifested consent, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that specialty should not bar Najohn's extradition and upheld the validity of the second prosecution in
234
California.
Thus, it appears that the United States may prosecute an extradited cartel member for offenses other than those for which he was
extradited. In so doing, however, the United States must first obtain
the consent of the Colombian courts prior to this second prosecution.
The Najohn consent exception could prove vital in prosecuting cartel
members for offenses that initially may not be extraditable. Furthermore, Najohn indicates that after securing Colombia's consent, prosecutors may proceed against extradited defendants for offenses not
listed in the treaty. Ultimately, this consent exception could aid the
United States in overcoming difficulties posed by the specialty and
dual criminality doctrines.
227. Id. Najohn's alleged receipt of stolen property violated 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1982) and
his conspiracy offense violated 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1421.
228. Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422.
229. Id. Najohn argued that these letters were insufficient to allow his prosecution in

California, because the United States-Switzerland extradition treaty bound the United States
without regard to the consent of Swiss authorities. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Id.
230. Id. at 1421.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1422.
233. Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422 (quoting Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197
(D.D.C. 1979)). The Najohn court reasoned that the United States-Switzerland extradition
treaty "does not purport to limit the discretion of the two sovereigns to surrender fugitives for
reasons of comity, prudence, or even as a whim." Id. The court held that in view of the
absence of Najohn's efforts to obtain Swiss judgment prohibiting this consent to further prosecution, the Swiss authorization for further prosecution was valid and Najohn's California conviction should stand. Id. at 1423.
234. Id. The court noted that to do otherwise would forsake the precept that courts do
not intermeddle in foreign affairs. Id.
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For example, the United States may wish to prosecute a cartel
member for both drug trafficking and tax evasion. Drug trafficking
appears in the treaty's schedule of extraditable offenses. Tax evasion
does not. 23 5 Thus, the United States may extradite and prosecute the
individual on drug trafficking. Under current definitions, this falls
within the boundaries of specialty and dual criminality. Subsequent
prosecution on tax evasion would ostensibly violate both doctrines.
However, if the United States could obtain Colombia's permission to
prosecute for tax evasion, the prosecution would be valid under the
Najohn exception. Given Colombia's professed positive attitude toward extradition and prosecution of drug traffickers, it appears unlikely that the Colombian government would withhold consent for
prosecution of offenses that do not appear in the treaty. This remains
especially true with regard to nonlisted offenses connected to the drug
trafficking offense, like the tax evasion offense.
c.

Prosecution on Post-CriminalIndictment Civil Lawsuits: Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard

In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard.236 Switzerland extradited Van Cauwenberghe to the United
States to stand trial on criminal fraud charges. 237 One week prior to
the fraud trial, Biard, the victim of the fraud, filed a separate civil suit
against Van Cauwenberghe. 238 This civil suit involved many of the
same facts pleaded in the criminal action. 2 39 Two weeks after sentencing in the criminal action, Van Cauwenberghe was served with
the civil summons and complaint. In opposing the subsequent civil
charges, Van Cauwenberghe argued that the specialty doctrine
shielded him from the civil service of process. 24° Expressly declining
235. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, at 140.11.
236. 486 U.S. 517 (1988).
237. Id. at 520.
238. Id.
239. Id. The complaint asserted a civil RICO claim, a common-law fraud claim, and
other pendent state law claims. Id.

240. Id. at 523. Van Cauwenberghe made two arguments in the district court to dismiss
the suit. First, he asserted that since his presence in the United States was a result of extradition, he was immune from civil service of process. Second, Van Cauwenberghe argued that the
court should dismiss the complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The district court
denied both claims. Id. at 520-21. In the Supreme Court, Van Cauwenberghe argued that the
principle of specialty requires immunity from criminal prosecutions for offenses other than the
offense for which he was extradited. Van Cauwenberghe also argued that specialty guarantees
the extradited person the right to be "free from any judicial interference," including a civil
action. Id. at 523.
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to rule on this argument, 241 Justice Marshall stated that the only issue
on which the Court granted certiorari was whether denial of Van
Cauwenberghe's motion to dismiss on the grounds
of immunity from
242
service of process is immediately appealable.
Although the Court explicitly reserved judgment on the specialty
issue, it did state in dicta that "[tihe right not to be burdened with a
civil trial itself is not an essential aspect of [the specialty doctrine's]
protection. ' 243 The Court reasoned that the principle of specialty
fundamentally affects treaty obligations between countries. 24 It operates to ensure that the requesting state does not abuse the extradition
processes of the requested state. 245 The Court concluded that a civil
trial involving an offender, prior to any binding judgment being rendered against him or her, does not trigger the specialty doctrine's
24 6
protection.
This language suggests that, if forced to rule on the issue, the
Court would likely hold against the extradited defendant and allow
prosecution on the civil charges. The Court's dicta indicates that the
United States may concurrently prosecute the cartel members in civil
suits, 'after extradition for criminal violations, without fear of violating the specialty doctrine. Van Cauwenberghe, like Najohn, could operate as a loophole through which the United States could prosecute
the cartel members for civil offenses, not listed in the extradition order. For example, in pursuing prosecution of a cartel member, the
United States might only be able to effect valid extradition for drug
trafficking offenses. Before or during the course of this criminal prosecution, federal prosecutors could also file a civil breach of contract
suit against the cartel member. Under a strict reading, the specialty
241.
242.
243.

Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 524.
Id.
Id. at 525.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 525.
The conduct of a civil tial, prior to any attempt to subject the defendant to a binding
judgment of the court, does not significantly implicate the receiving state's obligation
under the [specialty] doctrine. Unlike a criminal prosecution, in which the coercive
power of the state is immediately brought to bear, the state's involvement in the
conduct of a private civil suit is minimal. The state's role is simply to provide a
forum for the resolution of a private dispute. In the absence of an explicit agreement
obligating the United States to protect the extradited person from the burdens of a
civil suit, we believe that there is little potential that the extraditing state, in this case
Switzerland, will view the mere conduct of a private civil trial as a breach of an

obligation by the United States not to abuse the extradition process.
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doctrine bars this civil action.
However, based on Van
Cauwenberghe, courts might allow the civil suit to proceed.
Note, however, that in Van Cauwenberghe, a private individual
filed the civil complaint against Van Cauwenberghe. 247 In the event
that Medellin cartel members face subsequent civil charges in the
United States after the institution of criminal proceedings, those
charges will likely be brought by the United States itself. Though the
Supreme Court did not provide any specific indication in its dicta, it is
possible that having the United States as plaintiff could be seen as
exerting a greater "coercive power of the state" 248 on an extradited
drug trafficker. Van Cauwenberghe, however, leaves the door open
for bringing civil charges after the filing of criminal charges. It remains the courts' responsibility to interpret the case and either allow
or disallow subsequent civil prosecution based on the particular issue
at bar. Given the United States' general antipathy towards drug traffickers, application of the Van Cauwenberghe exception appears
promising.
IV.

EXTRADITION UNDER THE UNITED STATES-COLOMBIA
TREATY

A.

Extradition Procedure Under the Treaty

In pursuing extradition of cartel members, the United States
must adhere not only to case law doctrine, but to the procedures specifically set forth in the treaty. While case law provides a general
overview of the requisite formalities, the treaty gives a more detailed
roadmap of the procedure that United States prosecutors must follow
in extraditing the narcotraficantes.
Article 9 of the treaty lays out the procedural framework the
United States must follow in extraditing cartel members. This article
describes the necessary evidence and documents that must accompany an extradition request. Article 9, section 2 states that in all
cases, four additional items must accompany the extradition request. 249 First, there must be documents describing the identity and
location of the person sought. 250 Second, there must be an accompanying statement of the facts of the case. 25 ' Third, the text of the laws
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 519.
Id. at 525.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 9(2), at 140.5.

250.
251.

Id.
Id.
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252
describing the essential elements of the offense must be included.
Fourth, the text of the laws describing the offense's punishment and
the statute of limitations on the prosecution and punishment of the
253
offense must accompany the request.
Section 3 encompasses situations where extradition relates to a
nonconvicted offender. In this situation, a copy of the indictment issued by a judge of the requesting country, as well as evidence proving
that the person named in the indictment is the person sought for extradition must also be included with the extradition request. 254 Additionally, evidence showing probable cause under the laws of the
requested state, establishing that the person sought committed the offense for which the requesting state seeks extradition, must accom255
pany the request.
Section 4 relates to extradition of offenders already convicted in
Colombia. In this case, the extradition request must accompany a
copy of the conviction issued by a court of the requesting state and
evidence proving that the person sought for extradition is the person
that the conviction lists. If the offender has also been sentenced, the
extradition request must also include a copy of the sentence and a
statement evidencing the remainder of the sentence yet to be
served. 256
Section 5 provides that all documents submitted by the request257
ing state must be translated into the requested state's language.
Section 6 outlines when the documents accompanying the extradition
request shall be introduced into evidence. 258 Extraditing cartel members from Colombia can occur in only one way. A United States
judge, magistrate, or other judicial officer must sign the extradition
request. 259 This request must be authenticated by the Department of
State's official seal and certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of
26°
Colombia.
Section 7 requires that the requested state review for legal sufficiency the documentation supporting extradition prior to presenting it
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

260.

Id.

art. 9(3), at 140.6.
art. 9(4), at 140.6.
art. 9(5), at 140.6.
art. 9(6), at 140.6.
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to their judicial authorities.26 1 This section also directs Colombia to
provide legal representation to protect the interests of the requesting
262
state-the United States-before Colombia's authorities.
B.

Extradition of Colombian Nationals

The limitation on the extradition of nationals by some countries
remains one of the major obstacles facing the international extradition
process. 263 This potential limitation is important in the extradition of
Medellin cartel members because most cartel members are Colombian
nationals. The United States has historically extradited its nationals
in compliance with treaty requirements as a matter of policy. 26 In
contrast, the constitutions of civil law countries, either prohibit the
extradition of their nationals entirely or only permit extradition under
extraordinary circumstances. 265 Like other civil law countries, Colombia usually prohibits the extradition of Colombian nationals but
266
prosecutes them in Colombia for offenses committed abroad.
Article 8 of the treaty attempts to reconcile the different traditions existing in civil law countries, such as Colombia, and common
law nations, like the United States. 2 67 Authorities consider article 8
to be an "innovation. ' 26 It imposes an obligation on the requested
state to extradite all persons, including its nationals, where the offense
committed is punishable in both the requesting and the requested
country, and the offense was intended to be consummated in the re261. Id. art. 9(7), at 140.6.
262. Id.
263. Hearing: Worldwide Review, supra note 124, at 9 (statement of Mary V. Mochary,
Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).
264. Id. at 10.
265. Id. Civil law countries generally have the domestic legal authority to prosecute their
nationals for crimes committed abroad. In cases where fugitives have fled the United States
and headed for their own countries, civil law countries can prosecute the national locally for
offenses committed in the United States. Id. Modern extradition treaties between the United
States and civil law countries resolve this problem in one of two ways. In some instances, the
United States has convinced its treaty partner to extradite their nationals to the United States,
at least for egregious offenses. In other instances, the United States has negotiated treaties
containing "extradite or submit for prosecution clauses." These clauses provide that when a
country refuses to extradite because the fugitive is a national, it will submit the case to its own
authorities for a determination with regard to prosecution based on evidence that the United
States government provides. Id. at 10-11.
266. S. EXEC. REP. No. 34, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in I. I. KAVASS & A.
SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED STATES 140.13, 140.16 (1985) [hereinafter S. EXEC. REP. No. 34].
267. Id. at 140.14.
268. Id.
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questing state. 269 Under this provision, the Colombian government
would be obligated to extradite Colombian national cartel members
regardless of traditional civil law practices if both United States and
Colombian law punish the offense and the perpetrator intended to
consummate his offense in the United States.
Section 2 of article 8 states that if Colombia denies extradition on
the basis of nationality, it still must submit the case to competent authorities for prosecution. 270 However, Colombia must have jurisdiction over the offense for which extradition has been sought.27 1 Once
the competent Colombian judicial authorities have reviewed the case,
272
its disposition remains subject to prosecutorial discretion.
The importance of article 8, as applied to cartel members, lies in
the fact that Colombia could extradite a drug trafficker to the United
States even if the trafficker has never left Colombia. 2 73 This section
has immense value to the United States because prosecutors can request extradition of any individual they can implicate in a drug traf274
ficking offense, regardless of where the trafficker commits his crime.
In In re Russell,275 the Fifth Circuit noted that article 8 clearly provides for the extradition of nationals at the Colombian executive's
2 76
discretion.

V.

RECENT CASE LAW INVOLVING THE UNITED STATESCOLOMBIA EXTRADITION TREATY

Several recent United States district courts and courts of appeals,
269. Id.
270. Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 8(2), at 140.5.
271. S. EXEC. REP. No. 34, supra note 266, at 140.14.
272. Id. Article 8 provides that:
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the
Executive Authority of the Requested State shall have the power to deliver them up
if, in its discretion it be deemed proper to do so. However, extradition of nationals
will be granted pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty in the following instances:
(a) Where the offense involves acts taking place in the territory of both States with
the intent that the offense be consummated in the Requesting State; or
(b) Where the person for whom extradition is sought has been convicted in the Requesting State of the offense for which extradition is sought.
(2) If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Article, the Requested State shall submit the case to its competent judicial authorities for the purpose of initiating the investigation or to further the related prosecution, provided that
the Requested State has jurisdiction over the offense.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 8, at 140.5.
273. G. GUGLIOTTA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 100.
274. Id.
275. 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
276. Id. at 1218.
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have dealt with extradition in the context of the treaty. As extradition proceedings will likely proliferate after the treaty's resurrection,
examination of these decisions will aid in predicting how United
States courts will deal with cartel members' objections centering
around extradition doctrines. Further, as most of the future extradition cases will likely involve predicate offense crimes, such as CCE or
RICO, these cases will act as potential guidelines for tailoring the existing treaty to facilitate the extraditability of these offenses.
A.

The Lehder Case

On February 4, 1987, an elite Colombian anti-narcotics police
unit arrested Medellin cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder and fifteen of his
bodyguards. 277 Lehder had gained notoriety in 1985 when he publicly
offered to pay $350,000 to anyone who could kill or capture the head
of the DEA. 27 8 In March 1985, while he was in hiding, Lehder gave
an interview in which he appealed to discontented Colombian military
officers and Marxist revolutionaries and asked them to join him in
what he termed the "cocaine bonanza . . . the arm of the struggle
'279
against America. . . the Achilles' heel of American imperialism.
The Barco government quickly extradited Lehder to the United
States, fearing that he would either bribe or break his way out of
prison. 28 0 The United States government filed twelve counts against
Lehder, including one which charged him with engaging in a CCE.
Lehder challenged his extradition on two grounds. 281 First, he asserted that the Colombian Supreme Court decision which had approved the extradition request failed to mention the CCE charge and
28 2
that this omission thereby excluded the charge from judgment.
Second, Lehder argued that he could not be extradited for the CCE
charge under the treaty due to the doctrine of dual criminality.2 83 He
contended that the CCE offense was "so uniquely American" that it
28 4
could not satisfy the treaty's dual criminality clause.
In deciding the Lehder case, the court first stated that interpret277.

Bagley, supra note 6, at 86.

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. After Lehder's extradition, cartel members threatened to kill five citizens of the
United States for every Colombian extradited to the United States. Fortunately, the cartel
members did not carry out this threat. Id.
281. United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (M.D. Fla. 1987).

282.

Id.

283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 1527.
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ing the documents which authorized the extradition necessarily preceded any ruling on the validity of Lehder's arguments. 2 5 The
Lehder court noted that when the extraditing country has not expressly stated an objection to prosecution, the court must still inquire
"whether the surrendering state would regard the prosecution at issue
as a breach. ' 2 6 In responding to its own inquiry, the court gave due
consideration to the fact that the Colombian authority had not written its extradition decree with the knowledge that United States

courts would later scrutinize

it.287

The Lehder court then focused on

the treaty to determine if the CCE charge was an extraditable
offense. 288
1.

Lehder's First Argument: Extradition on the Basis of the CCE
Charge
The court first noted that it believed Lehder's focus on the Colombian Supreme Court's decision to extradite him was misdirected. 2 89 The court stated that upon granting favorable judgment
regarding the extradition, the Colombian Supreme Court was thereby
granting the Colombian President "authority to consider the extradition request without reservation.' ' 290 From that point on, the decision
of whether or not to extradite Lehder rested in the hands of the Co291
lombian executive.
Moreover, the court emphasized that even if the Colombian
Supreme Court did have the final say as to whether or not the extradition should be ordered, it possessed full knowledge of the range of
charges for which Lehder was indicted in the United States and had
not objected to any of them. 292 Although Lehder had the opportunity
to object to any of these charges, the record showed no evidence that
he had objected to the CCE charge on specialty grounds. 293
The Lehder court recognized that the Colombian Supreme Court
had not been entirely clear in describing some of the offenses. For
example, it defined one of the offenses as "participating in a criminal
285. Id. at 1525.
286. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1525 (quoting United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371,
373 (8th Cir. 1983)).

287.

Id.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 1525-26.
Id. at 1526.
Id.
Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1526.
Id.
Id.
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enterprise continuously with other persons (narcotics traffic). ' 294 The
court stated that although this definition may be imprecise, "Colombian courts cannot be expected to be centers of American legal scholarship." 295 The charges, as set forth in the opinion of the Colombian
Supreme Court, were therefore held to provide a sufficient basis for
296
extradition.
The court added that its analysis entailed interpreting the language of the Colombian extradition opinion in light of the circumstances under which the Colombian Supreme Court had rendered its
decision. 297 Based upon its analysis, the court concluded that the
CCE charge had not been excluded from the judgment regarding the
extradition request. 298 The Lehder court reasoned that "[t]he absence
of explicit language denying extradition on the CCE charge compels

the conclusion that the charge was included in the approval of
Lehder's extradition. ' 299 The court noted that documents from the
Colombian President indicated that his favorable judgment on
Lehder's extradition included the CCE charge. 3°° Further, the court
stated that if the CCE charge did not fall within the approval of the
the reaextradition request, the treaty requires that Colombia explain
30 1
treaty.
the
of
12
article
under
extradition
sons for refusing

2.

Lehder's Second Argument: Dual Criminality

In his second argument, Lehder contended that the CCE charge
was not one of the enumerated offenses in the treaty and had no comparable counterpart in Colombian law. 30 2 Thus, Lehder reasoned that
294.

Id.

295.

Id.

296. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1526.
297. Id. "[We] can do no more than look to the language of the Colombian opinion, in the
circumstances under which it was rendered, and conclude that the CCE charge was not ex-

cluded from the 'favorable judgment' on the extradition request." Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. The court stated that a final reason for confidence in the conclusion to uphold
extradition on the CCE charge was the Colombian government's lack of objection. The Colombian government had warned the United States that it would closely monitor this trial so
that Lehder's human rights would receive protection. Further, the court noted that Colombia
"has a record of vigilance in matters concerning the rule of specialty." Id. at 1526-27. Under
these circumstances, the court felt that the absence of protest by Colombia "further evidences
the correctness of finding that the CCE charge is included in the approval of extradition." Id.
at 1527.
300. Id. at 1526.
301. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1526.
302. Id. at 1527.
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the charge violated the principle of dual criminality.30 3 The United
States countered that CCE was a form of conspiracy related to narcotics trafficking which possessed a different name and different elements
than simple conspiracy.3 0 4 The government based its counterargument on three theories. First, the treaty's appendix lists narcotics
trafficking as an extraditable offense.3 0 5 Second, article 2, section 4(a)
30 6
of the treaty specifically approves of conspiracy prosecutions.
Third, pursuant to Collins v. Loisel 30 7 and article 2, section 2 of the
treaty, offenses need not contain the same terminology and definition
30 8
in both countries to qualify for extradition.
In considering the dual criminality issue, the court acknowledged
the plausibility of Lehder's contention that the treaty bars extradition
because CCE was not a punishable offense in Colombia. 30 9 However,
the court added that Lehder's argument relied on the premise that
whether CCE remains punishable in Colombia must be determined
with reference to the offense as a whole and not its separate, predicate
parts. 310 Citing Collins, the court stated that this contention lacked
311
legal precedent in the United States.
The Lehder court also noted that the determination of whether
CCE was subject to extradition under the treaty depended on interpretation of the treaty. 31 2 The court quoted Factor v. Laubenheimer,3 13 which stated that "if a treaty fairly admits of two
constructions, one restricting rights which may be claimed under it,
and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred. ' 314 In this vein, the court reasoned that extradition treaties
are to be construed liberally to effect their purpose-the surrender of
fugitives for trial on their alleged offenses. 3 15 The court further noted
that both the United States and Colombia negotiated the treaty in303. Id. The court noted that the determination of whether CCE is extraditable under the
treaty is "squarely a matter of interpretation of this particular document." Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1527.
307. 259 U.S. 309 (1921).
308. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1527.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
314. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1527 (quoting Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
293-94 (1933)).
315. Id. (quoting United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984)).
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tending liberal extradition provisions.316 This context supported the
reasoning that the "loose language of the Treaty was intended to include extradition under that important statute [CCE]. '31 7 The
Lehder court added that, through its extradition request to Colombia,
the United States proffered its belief that the treaty covered CCE of-

fenses. 318 By approving the extradition without reservation, Colombia reaffirmed this construction of the treaty. 31 9 The court stated that
"when parties act as if CCE is within the category of crimes subject to

extradition, this Court is not positioned to disagree.

' 320

In considering the specialty doctrine, the court reasoned that the

actual extradition of Lehder could be viewed as an exception to specialty, which the treaty outlines in article 15, section l(c). 3 21 Further,
the court cited Najohn and stated that "[p]rosecution on the CCE
charge could be viewed as an act of comity" between the United
States and Colombia. 322 In Najohn, the Ninth Circuit held that an
"extradited [offender] may be tried for a crime other than that for
which he was surrendered ifthe asylum country consents. '32 3 Since
the Colombian President consented to extradition, this act of comity
barred any objection to the extradition. 324 The court also cited the
Amended Convention on Narcotic Drugs 325 and stated that any elements of the CCE offense not covered by the treaty would be covered
3 26
by the broader scope of that document.

In conclusion, the court held that one could reasonably construe
316. Id. at 1527-28. The court noted that while negotiating the treaty, President Carter
had pledged to control the drug influx into the United States by enlisting the help of the
traffickers' headquarter countries. Id. at 1527.
317. Id. at 1528.
318. Id.
319. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1528.
320. Id.
321. Id. Article 15, section 1(c) provides that specialty does not apply when "[t]he Executive Authority of the Requested State has consented to that person's detention, trial, or punishment for another offense, or to extradition to a third State, provided that the principles of
Article 4 of this Treaty shall be observed." Extradition Treaty, supra note 109, art. 15(l)(c), at
140.8.
322. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1528.
323. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cer denied, 479 U.S.
1009 (1986) (citing Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1979)). The Lehder
court's interpretation of Najohn's consent exception states that the "requested government
may waive specialty on additional charges not listed in the extradition request." Lehder-Rivas,
668 F. Supp. at 1528.
324. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1528.
325. Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 25, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 1441, T.I.A.S. No. 8118.
326. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1528.
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the treaty to include participation in a CCE as an extraditable offense.3 27 The court also stated that the treaty's specialty exception
could encompass prosecution on the CCE charge. 328 Subsequently,
the court found Lehder guilty and sentenced him to life in prison plus
329
135 years.
The Lehder court's analysis indicates that a reasonable construction of the treaty provides for extradition of CCE offenses. Though
the Lehder reasoning is persuasive, no guarantees exist that every
United States court will follow this construction, since the treaty does
not specifically provide for the extradition of those engaged in CCE.
This absence of a specific provision for CCE offenses is one of the
treaty's shortcomings.
B.

The Cabrera-Sarmiento 330 Case
1. CabreraI

Before February 1986, Jose Antonio Cabrera-Sarmiento, a resident of Colombia, was a fugitive from prosecution on several indictments pending in the Southern District of New York, the Southern
District of Florida, and the State of Florida. 331 On February 14,
1986, Colombia extradited Cabrera and four others to the United
States. 332 Cabrera and a co-defendant were taken to the Metropolitan
Correctional Center, located in the Southern District of New York,
after a stop for a medical exam and change of aircraft in Miami, Florida. 333 Upon his arrival in New York, an examination of the extradition papers showed that they only authorized Cabrera's prosecution
on charges pending in the State of Florida, not on charges pending in
the Southern District of New York. 334 The mistaken transportation
335
to New York constituted the basis of Cabrera's arguments.
Cabrera argued that since his extradition only authorized prosecution on the Florida charges, the transportation to, and arraignment
in, New York violated the treaty, as well as the specialty doctrine.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 1529.
Id.
G. GUGLIOTrA & J. LEEN, supra note 1, at 336; see L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 1989, at

All, col. 2.
330. United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 659 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
331. United States v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Center, 629 F. Supp. 699 (1986).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 700.
335. See Cabrera, 659 F. Supp. at 170.
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Thus, the Southern District of New York lacked personal jurisdiction
over him. 336 He further contended that the New York arraignment
denied the State of Florida the right to trial because Florida waived its
right to proceed by knowingly permitting his transportation to the

Southern District of New York. 337 Accordingly, Cabrera petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus praying for his return to Colombia.33
The United States government conceded that it transported
Cabrera to New York incorrectly. However, it denied that in so doing, it violated the treaty. 339 The government argued that it did not
violate the specialty doctrine and that, in any event, Cabrera pos34
sessed no standing to raise these issues. 0
The court denied Cabrera's application for a writ of habeas
corpus. 341 The court stated that the Colombian government evinced
its view that the United States had not violated the treaty in a diplomatic note received from the Colombian embassy in connection with
these proceedings.3 42 From the tenor of the diplomatic note, the court

336. Warden, 629 F. Supp. at 700.
337. Id. Cabrera also complained of mistreatment by United States government officials in
the course of his transportation from Colombia to New York. An affidavit of Kenneth Hill,
Supervisory Inspector of the United States Marshal's Service, related the circumstances under
which Cabrera was transported. This affidavit persuaded the court that Cabrera was not mistreated at the hands of United States personnel. Id. n. 1.
338. Id. at 699.
339. Id. at 700.
340. Id.
341. Warden, 629 F. Supp. at 700.
342. Id. Cabrera impleaded the Colombian government in the case. On February 26,
1986, a Colombian representative visited Cabrera at the Metropolitan Correctional Center.
After the visit, the Colombian embassy addressed a diplomatic note to the United States,
which read:
[I]n accordance [with] instructions from the Minister of Justice, Enrique Paraj Gonzalez, [the Ambassador] transmits herewith... the official position of the Colombian
Government with regard to one Colombian citizen Jose Antonio Cabrera-Sarmiento.
1) According to Executive Resolutions 339 of November 20, 1985 and 43 of February 12, 1986, Mr. Cabrera can only be judged in the United States for [Florida indictments and charges specified].
2) The Government of Colombia is aware that Mr. Cabrera-Sarmiento is presently
detained in New York City, where he was taken on his arrival from Colombia to
United States territory.
3) The Government of Colombia reiterates, once more, that Mr. Cabrera Sarmiento
can only be judged for the above-mentioned counts, which are in the competence of
the State of Florida, not of the Court of the State of New York.
4) The Government of Colombia wishes to state that the Extradition Treaty between
Colombia and the United States will be honored if Mr. Cabrera-Sarmiento is tried for
the charges of the Court of Florida, not for the charges of the State of New York.
The Embassy of Colombia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.
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Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 13:955

reasoned that Colombia found no violation in the current proceedings
and that Cabrera's transportation to Florida for trial satisfied the
treaty. 343 The court focused on the fourth paragraph of the diplomatic note to support its reasoning. This paragraph stated that "[t]he
Extradition Treaty between Colombia and the United States will be
honored if Mr. Cabrera-Sarmiento is tried for the charges of the
344
Court of Florida, not for the charges of the State of New York."
With regard to the specialty doctrine, the court stated that
Cabrera's extradition and transportation to New York did not violate
article 15 of the treaty, which embodies specialty. 345 The court reasoned that since Cabrera was neither tried nor punished in this district, his de facto detention did not violate specialty. 3 6 According to
the court, the New York detention was not for offenses other than
those for which Cabrera had been charged in Florida. 347 Further, the
New York detention resulted from the United States government's
original lack of knowledge 348 regarding the terms of the extradition
and Cabrera's own request that United States officials allow him to
remain in the Southern District of New York pending the determination of his petition for habeas corpus.3 49 Finally, even though Cabrera
appeared and was arraigned before a Magistrate in the Southern District of New York prior to determining the scope of the extradition
papers, he still had not undergone trial or punishment for any
charge.35 0 Thus, the court reasoned that Cabrera's transportation and

arraignment in the Southern District did not violate the specialty
doctrine. 35

1

343. Id. at 700-01. The court stated that "the government of Colombia finds no violation
in what has occurred to date and confirms that the treaty will be satisfied if Cabrera is transported to and tried for the charges pending in Florida." Id.
344. Id. at 700.
345. Id. at 701.
346. Warden, 629 F. Supp. at 701.
347. Id.
348. It was this lack of knowledge that resulted in Cabrera's mistaken transportation. Id.
at 700.
349. Id. at 701. Two reasons existed for the United States' lack of awareness of the extradition's limitations to the Florida charges. First, communications with the United States Department of Justice Office of International Affairs led the government to believe that the
Colombian Supreme Court had approved Cabrera's extradition on the charges pending in the
Southern District of New York. Second, the Colombian government provided the United
States Marshals with documents written in Spanish, despite the marshals' inability to read
Spanish. Id. n.3.
350. Id.
351. Warden, 629 F. Supp. at 701. The court also agreed with the United States govern-
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CabreraII

On January 26, 1987, following the conclusion of Cabrera's prosecution in Florida, he returned to the Southern District of New York

on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.3 52 In this proceeding,
Cabrera renewed his argument that the specialty doctrine barred any
prosecution in the state of Florida and the Southern District of New
3

York.35
In his first argument, Cabrera claimed that sworn affidavits from

certain Assistant United States Attorneys in support of the United
States' extradition request stated that if acts which resulted in his extradition to Florida were identical to those charged in the Southern
District, the government would not prosecute the New York indictment. 35 4 Cabrera argued that if the United States Attorneys made
these promises in order to obtain extradition on the New York indictment by satisfying Colombia's concern over double jeopardy, the spe-

cialty doctrine would bar federal prosecution for the same acts which
the Florida prosecution alleged. 355 In response, the court examined
the affidavits in camera and found no promise or assurance from the
United States to the government of Colombia that the United States
would not prosecute Cabrera in the Southern District for the same
356
acts charged in Florida.
In his second argument, Cabrera contended that the Colombian

executive resolution of March 18, 1986 authorizing his extradition
had no validity.3 57 Cabrera claimed that when the resolution was isment, stating that Cabrera did not possess standing to raise issues of treaty violation or specialty doctrine violation. Id.
352. United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 659 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The
court noted that on March 18, 1986, the Colombian President signed Executive Resolution
No. 92, which authorized Cabrera's extradition on the indictment pending in New York. On
January 26, 1987, Cabrera returned to New York on the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. The court stated that one of the affidavits contained a discussion of the Justice
Department's Petite policy regarding federal prosecutions of violations that have already been
prosecuted at state level. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). However, this
affidavit made no promises of nonprosecution to the Colombian government. The court stated
that, from the face of the affidavit, the government reserved the right under the Petite policy to
prosecute the defendant in both jurisdictions. Accordingly, the court rejected Cabrera's argument that his extradition did not authorize his prosecution on the Southern District of New
York indictment. Cabrera-Sarmiento,659 F. Supp. at 171.
357. Cabrera-Sarmiento,659 F. Supp. at 172.
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sued, he was under United States custody pursuant to an earlier extradition order.358 Accordingly, Cabrera argued that he had no
opportunity to challenge his extradition in Colombia. 359 The court
disagreed. The court supported the government's position that
Cabrera could have appealed his extradition to the Southern District
of New York, since he could have appealed through counsel in Colombia who represented him in the extradition proceedings there. 36
CabreraI and H illustrate a key point. United States courts give
great deference to communications that indicate Colombia's willingness to extradite an offender. CabreraI relied on a diplomatic note
from Colombia to uphold Cabrera's extradition and to reject his specialty doctrine claim. This type of ancillary consent to extradition by
Colombia could prove of great value in trials where an extradited offender challenges the validity of his or her extradition.
C. The Alvarez-Moreno Case
In contrast to Cabrera I and II, United States v. AlvarezMoreno3 61 is significant in post-extradition trials. In many instances,
extradited defendants will attempt to limit the scope of evidence the
government seeks to introduce against them.
In 1981, the DEA initiated "Operation Swordfish" to identify
and apprehend narcotics money launderers. To facilitate this operation, the DEA created a sham corporation, Dean International Investments, to make the sort of money transfers that are attractive to
drug traffickers. 362 In the course of the operation, Dean Investments
attracted associates of Alvarez-Moreno, a drug trafficker, who ran his
operations from Colombia. 363
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Cabrera court relied on United States v. Jetter,
722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983). In Jetter, the defendants argued that they were denied due
process when authorities failed to bring them before a judge in Costa Rica prior to extradition.
The Eighth Circuit stated that this contention possessed no merit. The court could not discern
a violation of the United States-Costa Rica extradition treaty because the treaty did not prohibit appearance without counsel. In considering the due process argument, the court stated
that even if the defendant's rights were infringed, this did not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction. The court could find no shocking conduct on the part of the United States that
would militate against an exercise of jurisdiction. Id.
361. 874 F.2d 1402, 1403 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1484 (1990).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1405. The facts of this case leading up to Alvarez-Moreno's arrest and extradition are convoluted. The DEA established Dean Investments in 1981. Frank Chellino, a DEA
agent, posed as Frank Dean and ran the business, which specialized in money transfers. Id. at
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In January 1982, the Colombian government arrested AlvarezMoreno in Bogoti. 364 On October 14, 1982, the grand jury charged
Alvarez-Moreno and others3 6 5 in a fourteen-count indictment. 366 The
indictment named Alvarez-Moreno in six charges, including engaging
367
in a CCE.
In February 1985, the Colombian government ordered the extradition of Alvarez-Moreno and two of his associates to the United
States. 368 Pursuant to the extradition order, the Colombian government prohibited the United States from prosecuting the defendants on
three of the charges. 369 Subsequently, the United States only tried
Alvarez-Moreno on conspiracy to import cocaine, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and engaging in a continuing
370
criminal enterprise.
1403. In addition, two informants, Roberto Darias and Felipe Calderon, worked with Dean
Investments to recruit individuals to launder money. Id. at 1404. In July 1981, Chellino,
posing as Dean, met Manuel Sanchez, assistant vice president at the Bank of Miami. Later
that month, Sanchez referred Lionel Paytubi to Dean Investments. Paytubi informed Dean
that a woman named Marlene Navarro was interested in using Dean Investments to exchange
a million dollars a week from small bills to large bills. Id. After a successful first transfer,
Navarro took part in twenty to twenty-one transactions, according to government evidence.
In January 1982, Carlos Alvarado, another associate of Navarro and Alvarez-Moreno, met
with Darias, stated that he transported cash to Colombia for Alvarez-Moreno and offered
Darias 100 kilograms of cocaine. Id. at 1405. In June 1982, Darias met with Oscar Garcia
and Richard Jatter. Navarro told Darias that Jatter distributed cocaine in California for Alvarez-Moreno and that Garcia supervised cocaine distribution into the United States for Alvarez-Moreno. After several attempts to get Darias involved in illicit drug trafficking in the
United States, the money transactions continued. In January 1982, the Colombian government arrested Alvarez-Moreno in Bogoti. Id. at 1406.
364. Id. at 1406.
365. Oscar Garcia Jatter and Ricardo Jatter were also indicted. The brothers were associates of Alvarez-Moreno who helped him distribute cocaine in the United States. Id. at 140506.
366. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d at 1407.
367. Id. The counts were as follows: Count I, conspiracy to violate the Travel Act in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1952; Count X, conspiracy to import cocaine into the United
States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963; Count XI, conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; Count XII, using a communication facility in the commission of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b); Count XIII, using a communication facility in the commission of a conspiracy to
import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and Count XIV, engaging in a CCE in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. The Colombian government prohibited the United States from prosecuting the
Travel Act violations and using communication facilities for drug distribution. Id.
370. Id. The jury in the United States District Court convicted Alvarez-Moreno and his
associates on all counts of the indictment. The district court sentenced Alvarez-Moreno to ten
years in prison for conspiracy to import cocaine, ten years in prison for conspiracy to possess
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In the Eleventh Circuit, the key issue with regard to extradition
was "whether the district court violated the extradition treaty when it
admitted evidence of Alvarez-Moreno's arrest and prior money
seizures."' 37' Alvarez-Moreno argued that evidence of prior Colombian arrests and previous involvement in criminal drug trafficking violations breached provisions of the treaty. 372 In essence, AlvarezMoreno argued that the specialty doctrine barred any introduction of
373
evidence from offenses not listed in the extradition order.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments and
stated that article 15 of the treaty, which embodies the specialty doctrine, did not support Alvarez-Moreno's arguments. 374 The court
held that once the grand jury has indicted a defendant and the court
has begun trial for the offense listed in the extradition order, the specialty doctrine cannot limit the scope of admissible proof in the re375
questing state's forum in any way.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court possessed
broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. 376 The
court noted that the district court properly admitted evidence of Alvarez-Moreno's Colombian arrest because it related to the present ofcocaine with the intent to distribute, and twenty-five years in prison for the CCE violations.
The terms were to run consecutively. Id.
371. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d at 1407. In November 1980, United States Customs Service agents arrested three associates of Alvarez-Moreno as their aircraft prepared to leave Opa
Locka, Florida. Id. at 1406. In the aircraft, agents seized a duffel bag and five shoe boxes
containing $1.6 million in cash. The pilot had an additional $64,000 in his suitcase. Id. In
January 1982, the Colombian government arrested Alvarez-Moreno in Bogoti. Police found
three bags of cocaine and Alvarez-Moreno's business card. Charges were later dismissed. Id.
372. Id. at 1413.
373. See id
374. Id. The court stated that "[n]either the doctrine of specialty nor the articulation of
Article 15 lends support to the appellant's argument that the evidence obtained is inadmissible
to prove their respective roles in the enterprise." Id. at 1413-14.
375. Id. at 1414.
When a grand jury indicts a defendant, and the defendant is tried for the precise
offense contained in the extradition order, the doctrine of specialty does not purport
to regulate the scope of proof admissible in the judicial forum of the requisitioning
state.
Id.; see also United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 685 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1000 (1977) (allowing introduction of evidence to prove a conspiracy count and holding
that specialty does not permit foreign intrusion into the evidentiary or procedural rules of the
requesting state); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976).
376. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d at 1414. The court stated that at pre-trial, the government
argued that the Opa Locka seizure and Alvarez-Moreno's Colombian arrest were admissible as
extrinsic evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court admitted the evidence on
this ground. Id.
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fense for which the defendant was being tried. 377 The district court
also allowed the government to present evidence of Alvarez-Moreno's
Colombian arrest because it bore on the narcotics conspiracies
378
charges and because the offense occurred in the same time period.
The court held that the district court properly admitted the evidence
of Alvarez-Moreno's past violations to reflect the scope of the conspiracies, to prove intent, and to aid the jury in determining the character
37 9
of the offenses charged.
Alvarez-Moreno demonstrates that once extradited, the defendant
cannot use the defense of specialty as a shield to limit the introduction
of evidence against him. Further, in combination with Lehder and
Cabrera I and II, this case also represents the current attitude of
United States courts toward specialty doctrine arguments mounted by
extradited defendants, in the context of the treaty. In all four of these
cases, the defendants argued that specialty should either bar or limit
some aspect of their extradition from Colombia. All four courts rejected these arguments. Although these cases possibly reflect a trend
toward nonrecognition, or at least a dilution, of the specialty doctrine,
the United States and Colombia should not rely on the courts to facilitate extradition of cartel members. In examining these cases and the
treaty, several "holes" have been discovered. Three avenues exist
whereby the United States and Colombia can remedy these
shortcomings.
VI.

PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN THE TREATY

One of the treaty's major shortcomings is its failure to list analogs to the United States' CCE and RICO offenses. In attempting to
solve this problem, three solutions become evident. Though proposed
in the specific context of dealing with the failure to list CCE and
RICO, these solutions also have a general relevance in different aspects of extradition of the narcotraficantes.
First, in dealing directly with CCE and RICO, the United States
and Colombia could amend the treaty's schedule of offenses to include
predicate offense crimes such as CCE and RICO. This proposal may
encounter dual criminality problems, since Colombian law does not
specifically provide for CCE and RICO offenses. Alternatively, or additionally, the United States and Colombia could amend article 2 of
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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the treaty, which deals with extraditable offenses. The two countries
could add a section to this article allowing for extradition for predicate offense crimes. Although these predicate offense crimes may possess no direct counterpart in Colombia, this proposed section could
provide for extradition if Colombian law makes the. balance of the
predicate offenses extraditable.
Second, in effecting extradition of cartel members, Colombia
could provide the United States with written documentation authorizing extradition for CCE, RICO, and any other offense that the two
countries may want to prosecute. Such ancillary documentation of
the countries' intent proved invaluable in Cabrera. The Cabreracourt
utilized a Colombian diplomatic note which stated that no treaty violation had occurred in allowing Cabrera's trial to proceed in the
Southern District of New York.3 80 In a slightly different context, the
Lehder court relied on a Colombian Supreme Court decision that
lacked a specialty doctrine objection to Lehder's CCE charges in
holding that Lehder's extradition for CCE was valid. 38 ' Further, the
Ninth Circuit gave this sort of ancillary consent favorable review in
Najohn, stating that letters from the Swiss government allowed prosecution of the extradited offender. One clear advantage of this proposal is that it circumvents the dual criminality problems that the first
proposal might produce. Since the text of the treaty plays no role in
this solution, extradited defendants cannot argue that the text does
not list the extradited offense. This proposal could circumvent specialty doctrine arguments by showing the requested country's consent
to prosecution on charges other than that for which the offender was
extradited.
Third, the United States and Colombia could leave the treaty unchanged and rely on the recent pro-extradition interpretation given by
United States courts. The district courts and courts of appeals have
seemingly adopted a position favoring extradition of cartel members,
as exhibited in Lehder, Cabrera I and II, and Alvarez-Moreno. The
Lehder court, in particular, seemed to go out of its way to support
extradition in holding that CCE was an extraditable offense. 38 2 However, it seems unwise to risk valid extradition of drug traffickers in
courts whose rulings may vary. Although there seems to be an expanding body of law favoring extradition, the United States and Co380.
381.
382.

Warden, 629 F. Supp. at 700-01.
Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. at 1526.
See id. at 1526-27.

1991]

Medellih Cocaine Cartel

1007

lombia should leave nothing to chance and adopt either or both of the
first two proposed solutions.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Extradition is one of the most potent weapons that the United
States and Colombia have in their battle against the Medellin cartel's
cocaine trafficking. It offers a method to remove cartel members from
their "untouchable" position in Colombia and place them on trial in
the United States, where their wealth and political power have less
influence. Several factors make extradition an extremely important
facet in the prosecution of these criminals. First, the Medellin cartel
has corrupted and incapacitated the Colombian judiciary. Second,
the Colombian people, in general, have no desire to pursue, capture,
and place the traffickers on trial because of what this process will cost
them and their homeland.
Extradition remains the medium through which United States
and Colombian law enforcement authorities can collaborate and
transport the drug traffickers to a venue-the United States court system-that will effectively neutralize the cartel members' power and
influence. However, in the general framework of the capture and
prosecution of the narcotraficantes,one must recognize that extradition to the United States stands as only one step in the process. Colombian law enforcement authorities must first hunt down and
capture the cartel members-no small task given the wealth, power,
and mobility that the traffickers possess. Only at this point does extradition become a viable option.
Doctrines of international extradition and shortcomings in the
treaty itself present obstacles to a quick and easy transport of drug
traffickers to the United States. Given the rapidly evolving sophistication of the cartels, the United States and Colombia should take steps
to amend the treaty to ensure that important offenses such as money
laundering, tax evasion, CCE, and RICO become expressly
extraditable.
In the final analysis, the future success of the extradition of cartel
members will depend on the commitment of the two participating
countries. Colombia faces far more pressure than does the United
States in the campaign against the traffickers. The onus firmly remains on Colombia to continue the campaign against the traffickers in
the face of unrelenting threats, intimidation, and violence. The attitude of Colombia's citizenry, while understandable, presents a prob-
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lem to this campaign. On the other hand, President Barco's prompt
resurrection of the treaty and the Colombian government's quick extradition of Eduardo Martinez Romero after Luis Carlos Galan's assassination illustrate the strength of the Colombian government's
resolve. Ultimately, the battle against the Medellin cartel may turn
into a waiting game, with the cartel gambling that their power can
outlast the Colombian government's commitment to extradition.
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